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ABSTRACT 
 
Amnesties are evidently contentious issues.  The issue of immunity and impunity is 
significant in the peace versus justice debate.  What this thesis attempts is to explain the 
grant of amnesty as a legally permissible exception from the norm that those who 
commits crimes are to be punished – the very premise of punitive law. The demand is 
ever more so in respect of those crimes most atrocious.  
 
It approaches the topic from a legal rather than a moral perspective. Analysing the 
grant of amnesty through the perspective of legal obligation, the paper seeks to 
demonstrate that this is the first question to ask, by reference to the fact that, if logically 
inconsistent with the legal system prevailing, any amnesty will lack legal validity. And 
legal validity is the key both to the grant of amnesty and equally can inform on the same 
arguments its rescission. 
 
In order to demonstrate thus amnesties legal validity, it is necessary the paper contends 
to first consider the question of obligation and to do so from the historical perspective of 
the Roman legal maxim that underlie existing legal regimes, domestic and international. 
It then turns, by reference to Kant to the notion of permissive laws and how such are 
properly considered contingent exceptions.  The paper then turns to its core chapter on 
deontic logic, where it seeks to demonstrate the logical consistency of amnesty with legal 
norms and systems. And finally illustrates the manner in which amnesty acts as a 
derogation with only provisional effect on the validity of individual norms rather than 
negating the norm of punitive law per se. 
 
In conclusion the paper argues that by virtue of utilising contemporary legal notions of 
purposive interpretation, we can properly limit the scope and application of amnesty by 
reference to and only to its legal validity. 
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1. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“That a general amnesty should be included in a peace treaty is already implied in the 
concept of the latter” Kant (1999 (1798), 157)  
 
“Here then is the foundation of the Sovereign’s right to punish crimes: The necessity of 
defending the depository of the public welfare against the usurpations of private individuals” 
Beccaria (1986 (1764), 8) 
 
 
These epigraphs illustrate the fact that the juxtaposition of the notion amnesty, inherent, as 
Kant saw it, with the right to punish, and the need to exercise that right, is nothing new.  It 
continues to exist as a perennial problem, and is a seminal part of the peace versus justice 
debate. 
 
What I intend to attempt in the paper that follows is to ask whether the question often posed in 
contemporary literature whether amnesties are incompatible with international law (given the 
growth of international tribunals to which the term atrocity law is ordinarily applied) is the 
right one. And whether the answer that is most often given to it, that of incompatibility, is 
correct.  
 
I will rather wish to suggest that amnesty can be compatible with law in the sense of its 
continuity as a functioning legal system and that amnesty is permissible, as whilst it might 
affect the validity of another punitive law, it does so only, and only ever contingently what 
this paper will seek to address is the legal permissibility of amnesties. 
 
Moral and Legal Permissibility 
 
In a recent essay Christopher Heath Wellman discussed the moral permissibility of amnesties.  
He in fact posed three interlinked questions: under what conditions is it rational to grant 
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amnesties; what conditions is it morally permissible to grant amnesties; under what conditions 
must international community respect amnesties granted by individual domestic governments 
which then proceeds in turn to address (May, 2008, 249ff). 
 
Whilst I do not intend, to draw comparison with each of the moral conundrums he poses and 
answers with respect to amnesties, it is worth noting that he recognises a contingency within 
the system of laws that grants the amnesty that does not affect the continuity (or legitimacy) 
of that system, save where the grant becomes the norm rather than the exception. With respect 
to the second challenge to his conclusion in answering the question of morally permissibility 
in the affirmative, as a indication of that moral permissibility, he is faced with the state is 
under an obligation to punish all its criminals (ergo obliged not to grant amnesty) as not to do 
so infringes the right of other law-abiding that criminals be punished.  Wellman response to 
this is that so long as the state can ensure its fulfils its requisite function of securing its 
citizens’ basic human rights, satisfactorily, it is possible and permissible for it not to punish 
each and every last criminal (253).  In short the ability to exercise discretion in choosing to 
grant amnesty is finds its justification on the very system of legitimate government and its 
adherence to and exception from the laws it passes. That is equally I contend the foundation 
of the legal permissibility (and from such legal validity) of amnesty.  It is predicated on its 
consistency with maintenance of the legal system in which it is granted.    
 
Wellman concludes his essay with reference to the concrete example of Iraq, although I read 
his remarks as intending their application beyond that particular example.  Having discussed 
whether there is obligation on the international community to respect amnesties granted by the 
Iraqi transitional government and having distinguished between those crimes committed in 
Iraq by Iraqis and those committed by or against others, Wellman concludes that nonetheless 
“I believe that the best course would be to respect and “valid” amnesties where validity is a 
function of the free and informed preferences of the Iraqis as a whole” (265). 
 
It is the very issue of the legal validity of such amnesties (and the legal validity of any 
subsequent rescission) that this paper seeks to address. 
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Valid Positive Laws and the recourse to Morals 
 
What this essay thus intends is to provide a plausible solution to identifying such validity 
from a legal perspective, as I contend, if one identifies that the amnesty has no consistency (or 
logical entailment) within the legal system that purports to offer such, then that very 
contradiction will be sufficient to affect the validity of the amnesty. It is then not necessary 
recourse to underlying moral contentions, which if relatively autonomous, in the sense 
MacCormick intends, would be less conclusive than the heteronomous, albeit also arguably 
relative, (2008, 256ff) perspective the institution of law, the legal system would offer.    
 
MacCormick indicates that this nature of morality’s autonomy and law’s heteronomy is what 
makes them conceptually distinct, and thus I suggest merit, analysis individually.  This is not 
to deny that there are pertinent moral questions to be posed with respect to amnesties. 
However amnesty whilst certainly removing the legal sanction related to the act committed 
(although its rescission is equally capable of re-imposing that sanction) amnesty does not in 
the same manner remove the moral disapprobation of that act. 
 
This paper central concern is the legal validity of amnesty laws, and their relation to the norm 
of legal sanction or punitive law for those who have committed atrocities.  
 
The validity of law is significant because in the absence of validity, there would be no legal 
obligation to follow or respect the law.  We may of course choose that we will not follow the 
law, that other values we possess we consider supersede that obligation established by the 
legal system under which we, and others, reside.  That we might exercise individual choice 
yet be governed as one of a multitude by laws, is, I believe, the distinction MacCormick 
makes in describing morality autonomous, law heteronomous. 
 
The grant of amnesty is evidently an act of positive law. As “‘jus positivum’ means ‘law laid 
down’ and ‘positive law’ is ‘jus positivum’ translated into English” and where “[l]aw’s 
‘positive’ character is nothing more than than [the] very characteristic that it is laid down 
through intentional human acts aimed at regulating human conduct” one can explain amnesty 
as such law.  Why? Because it is possible and permissible in the system or one might say 
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institutions of law1
 
 that legislated the prohibition of the act that the amnesty in the sense of 
abrogating the punishment of, permits.   
H L A Hart, in his seminal work noted that even though the proposition, “that a legal system 
must exhibit some specific conformity with morality or justice, or must rest on a widely 
diffused conviction that there is a moral obligation to obey it…it does not follow from it that 
the criteria of legal validity of particular laws used in a legal system must include, tacitly if 
not explicitly a reference to morality or justice” (1997, 185)2. The possibility then of their not 
being necessary explicit recourse for the validity of individual laws could suggest that one 
might determine the obligation to respect such laws and indeed the possibility to pass such 
laws as relating to that system from which they are derived rather than influences upon that 
system. There are of course others who view the issue differently. Dworkin remarks “[i]t is 
obviously of capital practical importance whether moral tests...among the tests that judges and 
others should apply in deciding whether such propositions [of law]3
 
 are true” (2006, 2).  
I would not either deny that recourse to moral tests. It is necessary, I contend, rather to 
demonstrate, first the coherence of amnesty laws with the legal framework in which they are 
promulgated. For if such were a contradiction4
  
, namely that punishment and not-punishment 
(amnesty) simultaneously occur, one would have to be false.  In that sense either amnesty or 
punishment would not be logically permissible.  And if not logically permissible, as we will 
see in remarks from Kelsen shortly, it cannot logically be a valid law.  Hence it is necessary to 
demonstrate the logical permissibility of amnesty, and thus is legal validity, before turning to 
the question of the moral permissibility of such. 
The focus of this paper might then be said to address the existence of amnesties, as a legal 
norm in the positive sense Kelsen wrote of that “they have the characteristic of regulating 
their own creation and application”5
                                                 
1 MacCormick remarks that of “The institutional character of institutional normative order…the ‘positive 
character of law is simply another way of expressing this” (2008, 277)  
.  The next two subsequent chapters in effect address the 
issue of the creation of amnesty laws, as a permissible contingent exception from punitive 
2 Yet that is not to say that Hart denies that morality does influence law, indeed he provides examples of such, 
see (1997, 203f).  Rather the point is that there no necessary recourse for such in respect of particular laws. 
3 In the example he gives statutes, legislation. 
4 Describing such in very simple terms the first law of logic, that of non-contradiction states that the facts p and 
not p cannot be simultaneously true. 
5 Kelsen, The Function of a Constitution in Tur and Twining  (1986, 111) 
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laws6
 
, the last two chapters addressing then the application of amnesty laws, evidencing their 
logical consistency and lack of contradiction with neither the legal system in which they 
prevail nor the principles of precedent in that system. Or to describe it another way what gives 
an amnesty its validity. 
Kelsen’s Pure Theory and Legal Validity 
 
The author who will continue to permeate this paper is Hans Kelsen.  One of, if not the, 
eminent jurist of the 20th century, Kelsen is famed for his Pure theory of law. It is not alone 
however for that reason that I seek to rely on aspects of his work. He offers I suggest both 
elements of his ways in which his work is sometimes thought of as [neo]Kantian and his focus 
with respect to the topic on which this paper pivots, logic, and a particular type of logic at 
that. Kelsen considered that the Pure Theory had “discovered...a general logic of norms7, that 
is a logic of ‘ought’”. (quoted in Tur and Twining, 1986, 1908
 
).  He also articulated the 
analogy of his theory in its methodology with that of Kant, in the following terms: 
“Just as Kant asks how it is possible to have an interpretation, free from all 
metaphysics, of the facts given to our senses, in terms of laws of nature formed by 
natural science, so a pure theory of law has asked how it is possible to have an 
interpretation of the subjective meaning of certain facts as a system of objectively 
valid legal norms, describable in legal propositions, without recourse to metalegal 
authorities such as God or Nature. The epistemological answer of a pure theory of law 
is, on the condition that one presupposes the basic norm: one ought to conduct oneself 
as the constitution prescribes” (Tur and Twining, 116). 
 
The constitution is the foundation and the structure of the legal order and that order is posited. 
Kelsen further asserts that “[a] positive legal order represents a system not of coordinate but 
of superordinate and subordinate norms-that is, a hierarchy of norms, whose highest tier is the 
constitution, which is grounded as valid by the presupposed basic norm, and whose lowest tier 
is the individual norms positing a particular concrete mode of conduct as obligatory. In this 
                                                 
6 From the norm that crimes must not go unpunished – or that punishment follows the law (Wellman?) 
7 I will return to the issue of the logic of norms in chapter 4 when discussing deontic logic. 
8 This quotation is taken from the Ota Weinberger essay in that volume entitled Logic and the Pure Theory of 
Law who is citing a 1953 essay by Kelsen Was is die Reine Rechtslehre (What is the Pure Theory of Law) itself 
published in Klecatsky, H., Marcic, R, and Schambeck, H. (eds.) (1968) Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule, 
Vienna. 
6 
 
way the validity of the higher norm regulating the creation of the lower norm always grounds 
the validity of that lower norm. The function of a constitution is the grounding of validity” 
(Ibid, 119)  
 
The lower norm is the category to which amnesty laws would apply, given their being passed 
necessarily in legal systems that are already extant and which have laws prohibiting conduct 
which the amnesty addresses.  You do not need amnesty in the absence of extant rule which 
imposes a sanction for that prohibited conduct.  Therefore amnesty for atrocities is always in 
response to extant criminal laws (posited (positive) legal norms).  The existence of those 
preceding laws is founded on statutes passed by authorised bodies and their authorisation to 
pass such laws, founded on a constitution.  To prevent “the idea that the basis for the validity 
of a lower norm [being] the validity of a higher norm” and such leading “to an infinite 
regress” Kelsen determines that “one can refer back to a historically first constitution” (Ibid, 
111).  And this is fundamental premise that enable the translation of the subjective meaning of 
the act of will (in our case the draft of legislation, willing that what we ought to do) into its 
objective meaning (that it is a binding law for us, that which we must do – if we do not wish 
to suffer the sanction the legal order imposes).  The validity that ensures the objective 
meaning is it does comport with the higher norm.  
 
Now whilst that seems to fit coherently, the difficulty presented is that it is necessary for the 
basic norm to be presupposed.  And the grundnorm  can only be presupposed – if it were 
posited then it would simply fall again into the category of a subjective (real) act of will the 
meaning of which, in order to be objectively valid would require its valid based in a preceding 
non-posited norm.      
 
However Kelsen remarks, that the “historically first constitution…is, begin with, the 
subjective meaning of an act of will or a number of acts of will; and if one asks why the 
subjective meaning of the act creating the constitution is also its objective meaning-that is, a 
valid norm-or, in other words, what is the basis of the validity of the validity of this norm, the 
answer is: because one presupposes, as jurist, that one ought to conduct oneself as the 
historically first constitution prescribes. That is the basic norm.” (114).   
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Those then authorised to posit norms representative of that historically first constitution are 
the basis of the validity of each subsequent posited norm (that remains consistent to that basic 
norm) 
 
He continues, “The basic norm may, but need not, be presupposed.  What ethics and legal 
science say about this: only if it is presupposed can the subjective meaning of acts of will 
directed towards the conduct of others be interpreted also as their objective meaning, these 
meaning-contents be interpreted as binding moral or legal norms. Since this interpretation is 
conditioned by the presupposing of the basic norm, it must be granted that ought-propositions 
can be interpreted as objectively valid moral or legal norms only in this conditioned sense” 
(116). 
 
This presupposition however, in thought, only may be thought problematic: “[t]o the 
assumption of a norm posited not by a real act of will but only presupposed in juristic 
thinking, one can validly object that a norm can be the meaning only of an act of will and not 
an act of thinking, that there is an essential correlation between ‘ought’ and ‘willing’. One can 
meet this objection only be conceding that along with the basic norm, presupposed in thought, 
one must also think of an imaginary authority whose (figamentary) act of will has the basic 
norm as its meaning” (116f).  
 
When presented with the imaginary authority that has the basic norm as the meaning of its act 
of will, Kelsen respond that whilst such fiction, in the sense as the font of the basic norm, 
contradicts reality “since no such norm exists as the meaning of an actual act of will”(117) (in 
the sense of his early remarks on positive legal norms characterised by regulating their own 
creation and application) and that it contradicts itself in that it in effect indicates that which 
lies beyond the basic norm.  However in relying on Vaihinger, Kelsen considers such fiction 
an aid to thinking (and in Kelsen’s case juristic thinking) where the aim of such thought 
cannot be reached by the material available he determines “[t]he aim of one’s thinking in 
presupposing the basic norm is: to ground the validity of the of the norms forming a positive 
moral or legal order; that is to interpret the subjective meaning of the acts positing these 
norms as their objective meaning, i.e. as valid norms, and the acts in question as positing 
norms.”(Ibid) Kelsen’s fiction however is a nonetheless necessary fiction to enable the system 
of law to be grounded and retain its validity. 
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Having deliberated now on the foundations for Kelsen’s grundnorm, I wish to juxtapose his 
arguments with those of another significant 20th century jurist, Carl Schmitt. The reason for 
such is that Schmitt, position, as we will see, with respect to the primacy of sovereign 
decision can be challenged by consideration of the two Roman maxims, which form the 
subject of the next chapter. 
 
The definition of the norm for Kelsen “is the meaning of an act of will, not the act of will” 
(1967, 8) and that it is incorrect to characterize legal norms as the will or command of the 
legislator (Ibid). Schmitt in contrast extols a decisionist theory of law.  He remarks that “the 
concept of the legal order….contains within it the contrast of the two distinct elements of the 
juristic – norm and decision. [and] like every other order, the legal order rests on a decision 
and not on a norm” (2005, 10).   
 
Kelsen arguably suggested that the norm’s validity rests in its efficacy9.  Validity he saw as an 
ought, efficacy as an is.  It is the act of obedience that makes a law valid. The act is 
demonstrable of the law’s efficacy.  And its efficacy provides its validity.  As Kelsen 
remarked “[a] general legal norm is regarded as valid only if the human behaviour that is 
regulated by it actually conforms with it, at least to some degree” (1967, 11)   Thus if 
efficacious a law maintains validity.  Equally, as we will see in chapter 3 the norm maintains 
its validity notwithstanding judgments (value-judgments) such as judicial decisions that may 
run contrary to that norm.  In that sense an amnesty does not invalidate the norm that we are 
to be held accountable for our actions, for its sphere of validity, to use Kelsen’s term is 
spatially, temporally or materially finite.  In other words because the amnesty is limited in its 
scope it is a permissible exception from the norm.  If one were to contend that the norm, that 
we are to be accountable for our actions, is the basis of law, or in Kelsenian terms is the 
grundnorm (basic norm),10
                                                 
9 This is a particularly simplified version of his argument found in his essay Norm and Value, in Kelsen (1973) 
276ff and the question of validity and efficacy the ought and is he considers in greater detail in his Pure Theory 
of Law (1967) 10ff 
 there is still the permissibility of exception from even the basic 
norm.  The reason for such is that Kelsen considered that the Basic Norm of the legal order 
rests ultimately on the historically first constitution, be that posited by the resolution of an 
assembly or created by way of custom (or more properly the behaviour from which that 
10 The Basic Norm is a similar notion to atomic facts in theories of logic in that is it neither irreducible, nor does 
it rely on anything for its justification. 
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custom derives) (1991, 255).11
 
  What the historically first constitution does is to confer 
capacity to decide upon a sovereign, but as we have seen it is the state of affairs that is the 
intended outcome of those decisions – that which we ought to do; the meaning of the act of 
will – that is the basis of the legitimacy, thus validity and efficacy of those intended 
outcomes.    
Schmitt’s views which underpin his famed suggestion that exception is solely a matter of a 
sovereign’s decision relate principally to states in facing emergencies.  In that sense one might 
think of Schmitt as concerning himself with necessary exceptions.  The author to whom 
Schmitt alludes in support of his contention, Jean Bodin argued that there was a distinction to 
be made in times of emergency to the position that the sovereign stood in relation to the law.  
The suggestion Schmitt makes of Bodin’s view is that in short, the ordinary recourse that the 
prince would under his commitments to peoples (the estates) that ordinarily bind the 
sovereign do not bind in times of emergency.  In surmising this position Schmitt remarks that 
for Bodin, “the prince is duty bound towards the estates or the people only to the extent of 
fulfilling his promise in the interest of the people; he is not so bound under conditions of 
urgent necessity” (2005, 8).  Necessity thus offers a reason to be excepted from ordinary 
obligations.  That suggestion shall be considered further at the conclusion of this paper. 
Although Schmitt and Bodin were concerned with what we might loosely term states of 
emergency, the fundamental premise of Schmitt’s contention, following Bodin, that 
sovereignty was defined by the capacity to make the decision to except is equally as 
significant for the question of amnesty.  If Schmitt is correct in contending that “…the 
authority to suspend valid law – be it in general or in a specific case – is so much the actual 
mark of sovereignty” (Ibid, 9) and the capacity to decide is the determination of sovereignty 
then such is fundamental to the question of amnesty. 
 
Obligation, permission, and precedent 
 
The ordinary premise from which Schmitt, per Bodin, suggests exception may be made in 
times of emergency is the consensual nature of obligation.  I will discuss such a nature of 
obligation and its significance to amnesty in the first chapter.  Put in the simplest terms I can, 
                                                 
11 It is perhaps worth noting here than Kelsen himself notes the relation in German between Pflicht (duty) and 
pflegen (to be accustomed).  He uses this comparison to illustrate his point of the presupposition that underlies 
the idea “that people ought to behave as they are used to behaving” 1991, 3   
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people consent themselves to be bound, that is to say agree to place themselves under 
obligation, rather than have obligations imposed upon them.  This argument, I suggest can be 
founded on the principles of Roman law quod principi placuit and pacta sunt servanda, 
which, although there are variations roughly translate as “what the prince pleases” and 
“agreements must be respected”.  I will term these principles the historic notion of obligation. 
They give both edicts and agreements their force of law – or put another way their binding 
nature.  Whilst one might remark that it is naïve to suggest that at times throughout history 
people have not been subjected to the imposition of obligations, compelled to obey, I do not 
seek to maintain such an argument.  Rather I suggest that if one looks to the dichotomy 
between compulsion and impulsion, an argument can be sustained in favour of what is, in 
short the social contract theory.  What chapter 1 attempts, in relying on these principles of 
Roman law (and I should remark that I choose these principles as they remain extant today, 
even if not articulated in their original Latin -  though often they are), is to emphasise that 
they underlie the very premise of contractual obligations both within and between states.  This 
informs both the issue of law and exceptions from it, which is what amnesty amounts to.  
Quod principi placuit and pacta sunt servanda are the cornerstones of the national and 
international legal order.  Now that admittedly is a very bold statement to make, but my 
suggestion is that these principles are the foundations of normative order in their respective 
contexts.  And whilst they work independently within those spheres (national and 
international) in Chapter 2 I argue that they are intrinsically linked by virtue of the simple fact 
that we are obligated to keep our promises.  Drawing on detailed considerations of Roman 
codifications of law, I argue that the manner in which the Romans understood the principle of 
quod principi placuit was not in the manner in which absolute monarchies which were to arise 
in subsequent centuries did taking the wish and decision of princes as authoritative to a point 
of infallibility.  Rather the Romans conceived it – and I suggest theirs is the correct 
interpretation of quod principi placuit – as concession of power from the masses to 
individuals in anticipation that they would rule with reason.  Now although there are 
arguments as the primacy of international and national law or legal orders, as a matter of 
logic, the notion of quod principi placuit must precede pacta sunt servanda at least in so far 
as the latter is considered a fundamental principle of international law.  For both logically and 
linguistically you cannot of course have a system of international relations until you have 
nations capable of forming such relationships. Which itself is predicates on there being a 
system of states in existence. And in that sense I seek to conclude chapter 1 with the 
suggestion that one can consider the international and national legal orders, the latter being 
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the jurisdictions from which amnesties are issued, the former, more commonly in the last two 
decades, the jurisdiction in which the rescission of amnesty occurs, as based on a synonymous 
foundation.  That foundation, the basis from which obligation flows, is that of consenting to 
be bound. 
 
I shall then, in Chapter 3, turn to the inevitable question with regard to amnesty, namely by 
what mechanism can we suggest that those who have not fulfilled their obligation to obey 
laws prohibiting the acts we are terming atrocities.  I will suggest that an answer lies in the 
subject of the second chapter, a further Latin maxim, lex permissiva.  This simply is 
permissive law, and through a detailed consideration of this notion in Kant and particular 
interpreters of his work I will contend that this notion can be defined as contingent exception.  
This idea of excepting from rule or norm is of course nothing new.  Reform by its very nature 
is begun with exception. The chapter will argue that whilst permissive laws in Kantian terms 
create obligations that would not otherwise exist, in the context of the subject of amnesty and 
in light of the studies of Kant’s permissive law undertaken by Brandt, amnesty can be seen as 
an example of this newer obligation.  This obligation to amnesty, through Brandt’s 
interpretation of Kant, I will suggest can be succinctly thought of as a contingent exception 
from the norm that from law (in the context of atrocities) follows punishment.  In considering 
Kant’s work, I will principally be addressing a passage from the first part of his Metaphysics 
of Morals.  Kant’s discussion of lex permissiva related to the law of property (ownership), 
however as I contend his discussion equally relates to the property of law.  And one can use 
interpretations offered of Kant’s theory in indicating the possibility of excepting from norms, 
or as we have seen, their validity which is another way of referring to obligation.  Brandt’s 
Kantian permissive laws are that they permit that which would otherwise be prohibited.  This, 
I suggest is a means by which we can understand the phenomenon of amnesty and its 
rescission.  It is I believe only appropriate to situate Kant’s remarks on permissive law in light 
of his wider work. Lex permissiva, Kant remarks is a postulate of practical reason. I will 
consider that suggestion more in the second chapter but suffice to say that if we consider the 
definition of what makes a postulate of practical reason, we can speak to the efficacy and thus 
validity of amnesties.  This I attempt in chapter 3. 
 
The fourth chapter will pick up on the theme of the obligation to keep promises, and combine 
that with the discussion of lex permissiva in the second chapter and the notion of contingent 
exception.  To do so I will look at a field of analytical philosophy that concerns both 
12 
 
obligation and permission and may offer an answer to the question whether as a matter of 
logic we are obliged to grant and rescind amnesties. In other words, whilst there may exist an 
obligation to obey the law, is there equally, logically, an obligation in certain circumstances to 
depart or except from that obligation?  And within a normative framework if such is so 
permissible ought it to be obligatory?   Although in this chapter I will concern myself with 
what I might loosely term a deontic theory for amnesty, or what amnesty ought to be, and 
whether one can logically argue that there is an obligation to grant and rescind amnesty, my 
argument is for a distinctly legal rather than ethical or deontological theory of the practice of 
amnesty.  Amnesty is nought without a law against which the amnesty is offered and only 
exists (or is) to derogate or abrogate from already extant laws.   
 
Considering principally the works of G H Von Wright whose 1951 essay Deontic Logic is 
considered a watershed in the field, I will use the systems of deontic logic that he developed 
to argue for there being an obligation, in certain circumstances to grant and rescind amnesties.  
Deontic logic is sometimes referred to as the logic of norms12
 
.  The attempt of norm-logicians 
to bridge the is-ought gap whilst pertinent to the study at hand is one that I cannot in detail 
consider here, although in the third chapter I attempt to relate some of the salient points to the 
question of amnesty. What I argue in chapter 4 is that what is termed dyadic deontic logic 
provides a system which is consistent as an explanation of the practice of amnesty as a 
contingent exception.  Where it is possible to grant amnesty it thus makes such a practice 
permissible, and if we are permitted to do so then finally, I will ask are we obligated to do so?  
In the fifth chapter, having argued for the possibility and logical permissibility of amnesty I 
turn to ask if the grant or rescission of amnesty has consequences, in terms of the setting of, or 
departure from precedent.  In considering the notion of precedent, I will particularly concern 
myself with the principle of stare decisis.  This is the first premise of the legal notion of 
precedent as I will seek to address it, namely that certain courts are bound (that is to say under 
an obligation) to follow the decisions of certain other courts.  Simple examples are the 
decisions of higher courts binding on those below them.  In the context, however, of atrocity 
law, the courts within which accused are tried for their alleged crimes, are not so similarly 
bound.  For example decisions of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
                                                 
12 Von Wright in one of his last papers in 1991 posed the question  Is there a Logic of Norms? which in 
distinction to Kelsen, he claimed to argue in the affirmative.  My concern however is whether that logic can in 
certain circumstances - conditional as von Wright would term his later variations of his original system of 
deontic logic – support the proposition that there is an obligation to grant or rescind amnesty. 
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are not binding upon the ICC.  In keeping with the analysis I have undertaken of the work of 
Kelsen in the previous chapters, I will address the question of precedent thought the lens of 
Kelsen’s essay on derogation.  This chapter will advance an argument that amnesty can be 
understood in the context of derogation, rather than negation, of the norm that punishment 
follows the law.  Following Kelsen, illustrate the relative nature of derogation and illustrate its 
influence of on what Kelsen terms spheres of validity.  Such influence I will argue is equally 
indicative of the principle of stare decisis and by virtue of such accords amnesty, and its 
subsequent rescission with the idea that it has a relative, finite status.  This principle will also 
be compared to what has been termed the lex posterior derogating rule.  Paulson as we will 
see remarks that “the rule lex derogat legi priori serves as a means of resolving conflicts 
between legal norms issued at different times”.  Such may be of assistance then in 
determining the authoritative and peremptory nature of precedents and if they are to be 
followed.  Or might we ask are derogating rules contingent?  And if they are contingent does 
such mean amnesty can be considered obligatory, and thus what we must do?  Addressing 
these questions will be the concern of this final substantive chapter.  
 
Having indicated throughout each of the preceding chapters the nature, as I argue it exists of 
the malleable and fluid nature of amnesty, in conclusion I will ask whether one nonetheless 
considers amnesty and/or its rescission necessary.  Whilst on the face of it this suggestion 
might seem self-contradictory, for how can an act and its opposite both be thought necessary, 
I hope to have argued with sufficient clarity to illustrate how not only can such practices co-
exist, but to some degree can be thought of as necessary complements.  I hope to argue that by 
considering amnesty in the light of precedent, and thus being bound by such (if that is the 
case) I can argue for there being an obligation, in the strict legal sense, that supports the 
contention, not that there is a need for amnesties but that in certain circumstances amnesty is a 
necessity.  In short to suggest that one might travel from the idea that we ought to grant 
amnesty to that we must.  
 
If, as I contend, amnesty is a matter of law and not morality (albeit there is much debate as to 
whether there is a separation between the two) it is possible to advance a theory of obligation 
to examine the practice of amnesty and its rescission. 
 
For all of the remarks which I have made in this introduction and in the chapters which 
follow, much of which concerns historic notions, authors and debates, I argue that each of the 
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themes discussed has contemporary resonance and influence.  And lest it be suggested that 
amnesty in atrocity law is counter-prevailing one should note that the preference of amnesty 
to accountability is a notion reflected in treaty law pertinent to those conflicts which form the 
bulk in the contemporary world, non-international armed conflicts.  And that in such treaty 
law is a clear example of the obligation (albeit to some degree qualified) to grant amnesty. 
 
In 1977 the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions was adopted and for those 
state parties to this Protocol remains extant treaty law today. Paragraph 5 of Article 6 reads, in 
part that “[a]t the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict […].” The 
Second Additional Protocol however applies only to non-international armed conflicts.  I will 
not pursue here the debate as to what fulfils the criteria either of an armed conflict, nor 
whether it is non-international in character.  What I do want to draw attention to is the fact 
that there is no like provision in any of the four Geneva Conventions, nor the First Additional 
Protocol (applicable to conflicts of an international character).  Thus even in the space of the 
last three decades, there has been both an expectation and arguably a treaty obligation to grant 
amnesty for internal conflicts.  The inclusion of the term “endeavour” is of course not without 
significance in this context.  The extent of obligation is thus, to some extent, diluted by such a 
qualification.  To endeavour to fulfil an obligation one might suggest offers a degree of 
discretion that a mandatory requirement (simply ‘shall’ or ‘must’) does not.  In legal terms the 
interpretation most likely to be offered for the phrase “endeavour” is that it means that all 
reasonable steps are to be taken to bring about the intended end.  In this case that is the grant 
of amnesty.  That we should take reasonable steps therefore to grant amnesty, is to suggest 
that we are under an obligation where it is reasonable to do so we ought to grant amnesty.  
That where it is reasonable to do so that is what we ought to do, is arguably another way of 
suggesting that that which is reasonable is right.  In those circumstances the contention is not 
tenable that we are under an obligation to do the wrong thing.  The notion that right is action 
guided by reason is of course nothing new. And this contention is the premise, I suggest in the 
chapter that follows, that underlies the concession of power by peoples to sovereign who are 
thus given the capacity to make the decision (the act of will), the meaning of which is the 
validity of what makes that decision a norm, rule or law.  
 
That capacity as I hope to demonstrate in the chapters that follow becomes fundamental to 
understanding the validity and efficacy of amnesty based, as I argue it is, in a framework of 
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obligation. Such a framework makes allowance for permissibility of exception, such 
exception being contingent, in logical, moral and legal terms, and such contingency makes it 
possible to derogate from laws with which an amnesty would otherwise be incompatible. The 
argument however also holds I content for the rescission of amnesty, and, far from taking a 
position either on the grant or rescission of particular amnesties, my intention with this paper 
is to look to the strengthening the force of law by demonstrating that is it not a question of 
compatibility, but rather one of congruity.  
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2. 
 
AMNESTY AND OBLIGATION 
 
Obligation and Consent 
 
We saw in the introduction that for Schmitt, the sovereign is he who decides on the exception.  
It is that very capacity to do so which defines who is sovereign. This later proposition answers 
the question; who, or what, is sovereign? However, this leaves unanswered the question as to 
how the capacity to decide is obtained.   
 
Whilst that capacity might and has often has, historically and contemporaneously, been 
obtained through force, this chapter will look to address this question, from two maxims, 
derived from Roman law, which, although ancient in origin, are modern in their continuing 
effect. It is safe to suggest that what follows is a concern with the question of how national 
and international laws acquire or gain efficacy. This efficacy turns equally on the question as 
to whether there is an obligation to obey to laws, and from whence that obligation derives. It 
is necessary to answer this question first, as the validity of laws is both seminal to this 
question and significant from the perspective of the issue of grant or rescission of amnesty.   
 
As outlined in the introduction and to which I shall return to in detail in the next chapter, for 
Kant, a permissive law imposes upon individuals an obligation that would not otherwise exist 
(or perhaps more properly described, be present). If you can interpret such laws as permitting 
that which would otherwise be prohibited, it is nonetheless necessary to concern ourselves 
with the means by which obligations are derived under law. For, as I have already indicated, 
one cannot except unless one already has a rule to except from. Hence it is equally essential 
that we identify the means and methods by which obligation to the law is derived, for were 
there no obligation, amnesty would not be required.  
 
Given the multitude of studies conducted into the question of obligation in and under law, this 
chapter will only concern itself with the relation between two principles – quod principi 
placuit and pacta sunt servanda – which I will argue can be seen as the basis for obligation 
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under national and international law respectively. I wish however to posit that rather than 
being premised on distinct bases, they are arguably synonymous, in the fact that they both 
derive from consent.  I will not draw a distinction between contract theory and consensualist 
or voluntarist theories13
 
, for such is more appropriate to a larger study.   
The first pillar of my argument is that obligation to obey the law derives its force from the 
consent to be subject to the law that each person gives. Now one might counter such a 
suggestion with a myriad of critiques, to argue that obedience relates to numerous other 
factors such as coercion, sanction, or more particularly the fear of each.  However, whilst I 
will not contend that coercion and sanction are insignificant factors in terms of the obedience 
to extant law, my concern, for the purpose of this chapter, is rather the source from which 
obligation is possible.   
 
In both national and international law if one wants to maintain the view that consent is the 
basis of obligation, it is feasible to suggest, as I shall, that the notion, consent to be bound14
 
, is 
illustrative of this argument and demonstrable to the practice of law both domestically and 
between states. 
There is of course nothing new in the idea of consenting to be bound or governed. Martti 
Koskenniemi remarks in his forward to Elias and Lim (xv, 1998), “[f]rom Rousseau and 
Locke, and certainly from the American and French Revolutions, it has been axiomatic for 
public power to derive its justification from the consent of the governed.”  Such is the axiom 
of popular sovereignty.  The point I am attempting to make in this chapter, is that the axiom 
conceivably precedes this period.  Now I do not seek to deny the existence of absolute 
monarchies, and the form of rule to which Rousseau, Locke and the Revolutions responded.  
Rather, I wish to use the very terms which those absolutist rulers sought to invoke and show 
that a closer consideration of those maxims, far from endowing such rulers with absolute 
power, is more illustrative of the sense of rule by consent. Having demonstrated this from 
those Roman texts invoked, and argued consent as the foundation of domestic rule, I will then 
turn to illustrate why precisely the same rule, both in principle and practice, as illustrated by 
                                                 
13 Elias and Lim (3, 1998) begin their study of consensualism in international law with the antinomy of 
voluntarist and intellectualist conceptions of opinio juris.  They equate voluntarist with consensualist and 
illustrate how consensualism, even if paradoxical in some of its aspects is nonetheless efficacious for law. 
14 One might suggest that there is a distinction between consenting to be bound and intending to be bound.  This 
topic, whilst highly interesting and significant to adherence to law, is unfortunately one I cannot, for want of 
space, consider in detail here. 
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the notion pacta sunt servanda, holds for international relations, for I see law as concerning 
itself principally with the regulation of relations and thus by extension international law 
concerns, relations internationally     
 
This paper is, of course, concerned principally, with amnesty. However to properly 
understand the opportunity to except from law, one must first understand how law acquires its 
force, hence requiring exception from. Both historically and contemporaneously this, I 
suggest, is best appreciated through considering the relationship between the sovereign and 
the law. However before doing so I must properly situate human beings generically in relation 
to the law. That is to say relative to the law.  Historically and contemporaneously, I believe, 
the answer can be found in a fuller understanding of the foundations of rule. One of those 
foundations is the principle quod principi placuit. 
 
Quod Principi Placuit 
 
I wish to suggest that by a proper reading of the maxim, and associated themes, one can 
disassociate the notion from its pejorative use, and reclaim the idea of the power to decide on 
what shall have the force of law as premised simply and singularly on consent. 
 
Quod Principi Placuit is most often associated with determinate rule by a single individual for 
it invokes the notion that “What pleases the Prince has the power of law” (Kantorowicz, 1957, 
150 quoting Digest 1,4,1,) 
 
If one thinks of sovereign in the concept of an individual the question which then arises, 
arguably, is to whether the individual is sovereign as empowered by the will of peoples or 
whether by imposition of his will on peoples.  The former view is, I consider, the proper 
reading of the concept of quod principi placuit if one looks to the Roman Institutes of both 
Justinian and Gaius.   
 
Widely regarded as the premise, if not the origin, of much of modern law, the Institutes, along 
with the Digests, of the Roman Emperor Justinian, shall serve as the focus for my 
deliberations on how obligation to obey law pertains in domestic legal systems. 
 
Following the generally recognised reference for Justinian’s works, I shall begin at Inst 1,2,6  
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“Sed et quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem, cum lege regia, quae de imperio euis lata 
est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem concessit.” 
 
And translated as: 
 
“A pronouncement of the emperor also has legislative force because, by the Regal Act, 
relating to his sovereign power, the people conferred on him its whole sovereignty and 
authority” (Birks/McLeod 1987, 38) 
 
The Law in Writing 
 
An imperial pronouncement forms part, we are told earlier in the passage, of Roman written 
law.  Whilst it is not the only form of written law, acts, plebeian statutes and resolutions of the 
senate are, inter alia, other such forms, it is illustrative of the relation of a sovereign to the 
determination of law.  The description given to an act is pivotal; it is as a consequence of the 
Regal Act (cum lege regia) that the Emperor derives sovereignty.15 The description ascribed 
to an act in Justinian’s Institutes is perhaps a little convoluted, in that “An act is the type of 
law which the Roman people use to make motion of a senatorial magistrate, for instance a 
consul” (Inst 1,2,4).  A more succinct and perhaps clearer exposition can be found in The 
Institutes of Gaius, a work which preceded and informed the work of Tribonian, the Minister 
of Justinian, credited with composing the latter Institutes. Gaius explains (dependent upon 
translation, but in terms akin to Justinian) that the laws of the Roman people are to be found 
in leges16 or acts17, plebeian statutes etc.  A lex (singular of lege) is a command or ordinance 
of the populus18 or an act is law which the people decide and enact19
                                                 
15 For probably the seminal exposition of the this relation in the mediaeval world and beyond see Kantorowicz 
(1957) 
.  And whilst Gaius does 
not use the term, quod principi placuit to explain the Emperor’s capacity, when one 
appreciates the meaning of “act”, the way in which the sovereign makes law is evident, for; 
“An imperial constitution is what the emperor by decree, edict or letter ordains; it has never 
been doubted that this has the force of lex, seeing that the emperor himself receives his 
16 Zulueta (1946, 4).  For the purpose of this comparative analysis of translations, I will footnote the respective 
pages in those translations here as opposed to the usual practice in this paper to cite pages references in the main 
text. 
17 Gordon / Robinson (1988, 20) 
18 supra Zulueta note 4 
19 supra Gordon / Robinson note 5, at 21 
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imperium (sovereign power) through a lex”20 ; “An imperial enactment is law which the 
Emperor enacts in a decree, edict or letter. It has never been doubted that it has the status of 
an act, since it is by means of an act that the Emperor himself assumes his imperial 
authority”21
 
  
Zulueta, in his Commentary to Gaius draws the comparison between the Imperial constitution 
Constitutio principis and the passage cited above from Justinian:  
 
“Constitutiones principum. Ulpian (Inst. 1,2,6) says much the same as Gaius: 
imperial constitutions have the force of lex in virtue of the lex investing in the 
Emperor with imperium. Here imperium designates the totality of the powers 
conferred on him and the lex referred to must be the so called lex de imperio, i.e the 
ratification by the populus of the senatusconsult which invested an incoming Emperor 
with the traditional accumulation of powers.  If the imperial constitution was to be 
regarded as legally continuous with that of the Republic the Emperor’s power to 
legislate could be derived from no other source, and though such a power was not, it 
seems, among those expressly conferred by the lex de imperio, those that were granted 
were so extensive that the power to legislate was an inevitable practical consequence.” 
(15) 
 
The legitimacy of the sovereign’s determination of that which is (written) law, is thus a 
consequence of the conference of the power to determine law, vested, originally it would 
appear in “the people” generically, by virtue of a command, ordinance or act of the people to 
the sovereign.   
 
Equally, one ought not forget the significance which, following Kantorowicz, can be 
attributed to the inclusion of the conjunctive et in the Roman text.  As Kantorowicz remarks 
such is indicative of the fact that the will or pleasure of the prince is but one form of 
legislature.  The question as to whether this amounts to a permanent transfer of power from 
peoples to sovereigns per se or rather a conditional concession “only a limited and revocable 
concessio” (103) from people to an individual sovereign gave rise to a dualist notion of 
                                                 
20 supra Zulueta note 4 
21 supra Gordon / Robinson note 7  
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sovereignty, that of corpore and politic, which are examined at length and indeed are the two 
bodies in the title of Kantorowicz’s seminal work. 
 
To understand the significance of the concession of power from the people to the prince, and 
the manner in which such power was employed throughout periods often thought of as 
absolute rule, one needs to consider two apparently conflicting notions related to quod 
principi placuit.  The first is that the sovereign is not bound by the law, sometimes expressed 
as the maxim, Princeps legibus solutus est. The second, that sovereigns demonstrate their 
worthiness to be sovereign by subjecting themselves to law, found in the lex digna. 
   
The fundamental point is not that the sovereign had no obligation under the law. In fact it may 
be argued that the sovereign ought to place himself under the law, for not to do so would be 
indicative of his unworthiness to rule (contra the lex digna “it is a statement worthy of a ruler 
for the Prince to profess himself bound by the laws” Tierney, 1963b 386). Rather the 
consequence was that there was no effective sanction against him for want of a tribunal 
capable of coercing obedience.  It is not that the sovereign were not even under the 
jurisdiction of the law, for indeed it was the sovereign who would say (dīcere) what the law 
(juris/jus) was and by virtue of such place himself under its jurisdiction.  It should be borne in 
mind, as Tierney remarks that that there is no magistrate who can sit in judgment on the 
sovereign is not explicit in the work of the glossator.  When dealing with, what might be 
thought of as the concept of binding precedent,22
 
 Accursius’ gloss is that “magistrates could 
not be subjected to coercion by equal or inferior magistrates” (Ibid, 388). Tierney explains 
that whilst “[t]he gloss at this point did not draw any further conclusions about the status of 
the emperor…the implication was obvious. There was no magistrate superior to the emperor; 
therefore he was not subject to legal coercion” (Ibid). Clearly in a constitutional contemporary 
context, the separation of powers have the effect of subjecting governments to legal coercion, 
the significant point to note is that the intention underlying both the medieval and 
contemporary principles is an expectation that those who rule do so ‘in accordance with the 
law’.  Finally it is the proper sense of accordance that is to say in agreement with the law, 
which implies the notion of consensualism, in that to act in accord is synonymous with 
consenting to be bound.  
                                                 
22 In Chapter 5 I will discuss in more detail the principle of stare decisis or binding precedent and its relation to 
the question of amnesty. 
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Kantorowicz’s consideration of the sovereign’s own subjugation to the law is equally helpful 
in this light.  In reconciling the notions of subjugation discussed above, Kantorowicz cites 
Frederick II who remarked to the senators and people of Rome “For although our majesty is 
free from all laws, it is nevertheless not altogether exalted above the judgement of Reason, the 
Mother of all Law” (1957, 105f).  Kantorowicz’s observation of this imperial pronouncement 
is that it amounts to a statement of the “Prince’s voluntas ratione regulata, his “Will directed 
by reason”” (Ibid 106). 
  
In the discussions as to the nature of this dichotomy one solution, proffered by Schulz, is that 
one may take the view that by virtue of the lex regia both peoples consent to be bound by the 
decisions of their sovereign, when taken voluntas ratione regulata, and that the sovereign 
equally consents to be bound. For not to do so would negate the efficacy of the power to make 
law as “so much does our authority depend on the authority of the law” (quoted in Tierney, 
(1963a))  
 
In this sense, if one adopts such reconciliation between lex regia and lex digna in that it does 
not disavow the sovereign of the capacity not to be sanctioned by the law, but nonetheless 
remained obligated to it we can begin to analyse the concept of the grant and rescission of 
amnesty in light of obligation and dispensation.  Taking Tierney’s quote from Aquinas’ 
Summa Theologica “the Prince is also above the law in that, if it is expedient, he can change 
the law, or dispense from it according to time and place” (1963a, 304), the significance of this 
phrase both in light of our subsequent discussions of contingent exceptions and its role in the 
grant and rescission of amnesty, is evident. The sovereign, whilst acting within the bounds to 
which he has committed himself to, nonetheless, when expedient, which is a lower threshold 
than necessary, may contingently except from the law, for himself or others. Expediency may 
thus be a factor in support of the exception from law, for example as amnesty. 
 
The Law in Custom 
 
Now as we have seen the question of acts and imperial pronouncements have the force of law, 
yet are clearly written law.  This then raises the question, arguably preceding that point of the 
drafting of conventional, codified law, of how customary law acquires the force of law. 
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One answer can be found in a work of seminal importance to the common law tradition of 
English law, and for that matter many other legal systems that derive from its premises.  In the 
thirteenth century work of Henri de Bracton we find the following explanation; “England uses 
unwritten law and custom.  There law derives from nothing written [but] from what usage has 
approved. Nevertheless it will not be absurd to call English laws leges, though they are 
unwritten, since whatever has been rightly decided and approved with the counsel and consent 
of the magnates and the general agreement of the res publica , the authority of the king or 
prince having first been added thereto, has the force of law”. (1968, 19)  This would seem to 
imbue custom with a similar force of law as conventional, written law. 
 
Bracton might be said to reflect Gaian and Justinian jurisprudence and the place of the king in 
relation to the law as not the sole arbiter on that which is to be considered law.  However, 
such reflections may seem to leave unanswered, the extent to which the power to legislate, so 
derived, may be exercised by the sovereign.   
 
Bracton’s contemporary, St Thomas Aquinas arguably provides the necessary restraint to the 
exercise of the sovereign’s unfettered will; reason.  In a passage entitled “Reason and Will in 
Law” in the Summa Theologica St Thomas remarks  
 
“Reason has the power to move action from the will, as we have shown already: for reason 
enjoins all that is necessary to some end, in virtue of the fact that the end is desired.  But will, 
if it is to have the authority of law, must be regulated by reason when it commands.  It is in 
this sense that we should understand the saying that the will of the prince has the power of 
law.  In any other sense the will of the prince becomes an evil rather than law” (1959, 111) 
 
It is not without significance that the penultimate sentence has a footnote in the translation 
which reads “The reference is to the text in the Roman law: “Quod principi placuit legis habet 
vigorem” (Ibid, n 1) 
 
Reason is thus the regulation of law, when it is the expression of will.  Law founded on 
unreason, is not just bad law, but - if we look to the Latin original, translated as evil, iniquitas 
– it is iniquity.   
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The object and purpose of law, is for St Thomas, the Common Good.  And the right to 
promulgate it is, in line with both his Aristotelian views and the Roman juristic principles 
espoused in the Institutes, that of the community as a whole, or those who, to use Thomas’ 
words, have as their duty or charge the representation or care of the community. 
 
Some three centuries after Bracton and Aquinas, Alberico Gentili, in his 1589 work, (which 
was later enhanced in his work published in 1612) having cited the passage discussed above 
from the Institutes, comments; “It is true that the people conferred all sovereignty and power, 
but they did so in order that they might be governed by men, not sold like cattle.  Reason tells 
us this, and the language (my emphasis) of the decree shows the same thing. Listen to it “Let 
power and control issue from the city, when the Senate has decreed it or the people have 
voted it” (Cicero on Laws III (iil, 9)…Did the people give more than it possessed itself? Even 
the people could not do that.  The theologians are mistaken and the jurists flatter, when they 
maintain that everything is allowed to princes and that they have supreme and unrestricted 
power.” (1933, 371) 
 
The suggestion Gentili makes is an allusion to the pejorative manner in which the maxim is 
now regularly employed.  It is said to express the unjust nature of absolute rule.  However to 
describe the maxim pejoratively I would contend is to misdirect criticism against the notion, 
when it ought to be properly directed at its exegetes.  As we have seen the context in which 
the terminology was used in Roman law is clearly in the sense of a notion of pleasure 
commensurate with the intentions of the populace as a whole.  That, rather than the unchecked 
decision of “sovereign” will, was the sentiment the maxim was to express.  The sovereign is 
thus restricted in the manner to which they may legislate, to the extent that the people could 
(or perhaps would) permit.  Some might suggest my argument displays a naivety of the nature 
of absolute rulers throughout history.  I do not deny that such have and no doubt continue to 
exist, but that is not my argument.  More significantly I wish to illuminate the positive, not 
pejorative nature of the maxim, when properly interpreted.  One should resist the temptation 
to apply a Machiavellian gloss to tenets of Roman law.   In this sense I wish to follow the 
papers written by Brian Tierney concerning Accursius and Bracton on the place of the prince 
in relation to the law.  In conclusion Tierney notes that Accursius, far from inferring absolutist 
maxims from the constitutional principles extolled in Roman law, rather elicited those 
constitutional intentions from the texts “intended to buttress Justinian’s theocratic 
absolutism.” (1963b, 400) 
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The real question thus to be asked is whether one can safely interpret the notion of quod 
principi placuit as synonymous with the notion of pacta sunt servanda.   
 
In that sense one may perhaps pose the question; does a sovereign consent themselves to be 
bound by law and does so in good faith?  If one follows Tierney’s argument on Accursius’ 
gloss on the Corpus Iuris Civilis it would appear certainly that the answer to the first part of 
the question is in the affirmative; “Nevertheless by his own will he subjects himself” (Ibid, 
391) 
 
Furthermore Gentili provides one possible, albeit linguistic, explanation for the notion of 
good faith being the premise of agreement. In a commentary entitled, On the Law of 
Agreements, Gentili writes “…a contract of sovereigns, all of whose agreements are based on 
good faith. All the dealings of sovereigns are upon the basis of right and justice (ex bono et 
aequo); all are dependent on the customs and institutions of the nations according to the 
accepted view of all the interpreters” and that “…as Baldus himself says…the name of treaty 
(foedus) is by some derived from faith (fides)” (1933, 361)23
 
 
Exactly a century after Gentili, Locke wrote Two Treatises on Government, and echoes his 
predecessor by remarking, ably surmised by Tierney, that “since [man] did not have absolute 
power over his own life, he could not concede an absolute power over himself to anyone 
else.” (1992, 60).  The concept of the concession of power is of course infused throughout the 
point I am seeking to make.  It is as a result of the concession of power by the people, who are 
imbued with such power given their natural state of self-determination, that the sovereign 
gains the capacity to rule.  “Government with the consent of the governed” as Locke would 
have it.  Even though Locke’s Two Treatises are a response to Filmer’s absolutism and the 
Second Treatise is the work from which the celebrated maxim above is drawn and said to 
have influenced the American and French revolutions and no doubt much since, such 
sentiment, is equally present and indeed prevalent in a proper reading of the notion of Quod 
principi placuit. If I am right in that contention then the synonymy of consent between this 
maxim and the one fundamental to the practice of international law, and for that matter 
relations is clear. 
                                                 
23 Theodor Meron draws on this passage in his paper The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages 
AJIL Vol. 89, No.1, (Jan., 1995) pp.1-20 
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“A command is binding, not because the individual commanding has an actual superiority in 
power, but because he is ‘authorized’ or ‘empowered’ to issue commands of a binding nature.  
And he is “authorized” or empowered” only if a normative order, which is presupposed to be 
binding, confers on him this capacity, the competence to issue binding commands.  Then, the 
expression of his will, directed to the behaviour of another individual, is a binding 
command…the binding force of a command is not “derived” from the command itself but 
from the condition under which the command is being issued.  Supposing that the rules of law 
are binding commands, it is clear that binding force resides in those commands because they 
are issued by competent authorities” (1946, 31f) 
   
Although in the above passage Kelsen is remarking on Austinian jurisprudence, he could 
equally, I would suggest, be remarking on quod principi placuit, for the capacity the 
command is the lex regia, and the condition under which the command is issued is the 
condition of consent to be bound. 
 
The correlation of  consenting to be bound, when combined with the notion of the lex digna 
indicative, one might argue, of good faith, allows us to next consider the nature of obligation 
in international law; pacta sunt servanda. 
 
Pacta Sunt Servanda 
 
In international law, obligation is invariably, if not exclusively, in the first instance, derived 
from and defined by the notion, pacta sunt servanda.  Its significance may be illustrated by 
the suggestion that it “is arguably the oldest principle of international law” (Shaw, 633.) One 
explanation of the concept is that it is “the principle of good faith fulfilment of obligations 
under international law” (Lukashuk, 1989, 513). Intriguingly it is both consensually based yet 
necessary for the practice and continuity of international relations; “the principle of good faith 
fulfilment of assumed obligations is objectively needed. It is the jus necessarium. 
Nevertheless, no matter how great the need for a principle, it could be established only by 
way of the consent of states” (Ibid). 
 
That there is in Lukashuk’s view an objective need, a necessity, underlying the principle is 
interesting, particularly when we refer back to our previous observations of each of Kant’s 
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postulates of practical reason being equally based upon a necessity.  Nonetheless this 
necessity is and must be predicated on consent, as, following the Lotus case before the 
Permanent International Court of Justice, Lukashuk boldly asserts, “Like all other rules of 
international law, the principle of good faith fulfilment of obligations derives from, and is 
kept in force by, the general consent of states. The detailed content of the principle can also be 
seen to be developing on a consensual basis. Consent is the only way to establish rules 
that legally binds sovereign states.”(Ibid)  
 
The legal maxim pacta sunt servanda expresses then both the idea that agreements (treaties) 
will be binding on those, and only those, who enter into them and that they must be performed 
in good faith (Shaw 633; Brownlie 620). Having explored the idea and application of this 
doctrine, I will pose the obvious question, in light of the extant topic of this paper: Is the 
rescission of amnesty (when articled in a peace agreement) not a contradiction of both the 
elements of the principle pacta sunt servanda?  On the face of it the answer would appear self 
evidently, yes.  Those who have entered into the peace agreement clearly do not consider 
themselves bound by that provision, and in a contemporary setting it begs the question, if 
international justice is anticipated, whether such agreement was, in fact, entered into in good 
faith. 
 
It is worth noting the contemporary codification of the principle of good faith fulfilment of 
obligations found in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention in the Law of Treaties.  This article, 
entitled “Pacta sunt servanda” reads, simply: 
 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith. 
 
The commentary to the draft article reads: 
 
 Commentary 
(1) Pacta sunt servanda—the rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be 
performed in good faith— is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties. Its 
importance is underlined by the fact that it is enshrined in the Preamble to the 
Charter of the United Nations. As to the Charter itself, paragraph 2 of Article 2 
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expressly provides that Members are to "fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter"24
 
 
Shaw observes of pacta sunt servanda that “[t]he law of treaties rests inexorably upon this 
principle since the whole concept of binding international agreements can only rest upon the 
presupposition that such instruments are commonly accepted as possessing that quality” – It is 
not the instrument but, to use Lukashuk’s phrase, “the international rules that impart legal 
force to them” (516).  Brownlie comments “Pacta sunt servanda.  The Vienna Convention 
prescribes a certain presumption as to the validity and continuance in force of a treaty and 
such a presumption may be based on pacta sunt servanda as a general principle of 
international law; a treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed by them 
in good faith” (620). 
 
Good faith, it seems thus is seminal to the notion I am concerned with here. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1974 remarked “One of the basic principles governing the creation 
and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith”25
 
  
Good faith is, in the view of the ICJ therefore the very foundation from which obligation 
derives its force. 
One might of course object to my discussion of pacta sunt servanda, and particularly 
reference to it as a provision of the Vienna Convention, as the Convention, by its very nature 
has as its subjects, states, not individuals.  Inevitably, given the nature of contemporary 
conflict, the majority of parties to peace agreements are “non-state actors”, who by definition 
are incapable of concluding treaties and their associate obligations.  However as indicated by 
the ICJ it significance, by virtue of the presence and purpose of good faith, extends beyond 
mere treaties, concluded between states, to agreement per se whomsoever the parties may be. 
 
Good faith 
 
In reviewing the work of Elizabeth Zoller, which he thought seminal to any discussion on the 
concept of good faith, Virally remarks that the moral premise upon which Zoller places good 
                                                 
24 p.211 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol II. Draft Articles on the law of treaties with 
commentaries; Retrieved from http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf.   
25 ICJ Reports, 1974, pp 253, 267 cited in Shaw, p.81  
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faith, is unsurprising given it is viewed by her as subjective; “resting upon individual 
psychology”, but that for Virally “[g]ood faith is certainly that, but not only that”. It is also 
indicative of “rules of behaviour”. (1983, 131)  One might suggest then that it concerns a shift 
from intuition to action.   
 
If one wishes to see an example of the call to action the doctrine of good faith invokes, one 
might consider Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech to the UN in 1988. Gorbachev in translation is 
reporting as “urging ‘the political, judicial and moral importance of the ancient Roman 
maxim: pacta sunt servanda! – agreements must be honored,’ and noting that ‘[a]s the 
awareness of our common fate grows, every state would be genuinely interested in confining 
itself within the limits of international law.” (Koh n156).  Gorbachev would it seems be 
drawing a link between the notion of good faith which is the premise and basis upon which 
pacta sunt servanda draws its validity, and the commonality and communality which it is 
intended to foster. 
 
In a chapter entitled, State Responsibility and the ‘Good Faith’ Obligation in International 
Law, Guy Goodwin-Gill offers a number of observations from which I shall now draw.  
Citing the same quotation from the judgment of the ICJ given above, Goodwin-Gill asserts 
that not only is good faith integral to the principle pacta sunt servanda, “but also applies 
generally throughout international law” (2004, 85). Similarly indicative of this contention is 
the iteration of the term in fundamental documents underlying the principles and practice of 
international law and relations, the UN Charter being only one such instrument. Further and 
illustrative of its pervasiveness in international relations, Goodwin-Gill cites the catalogue of 
instances enumerated by the ICJ in a 1998 Judgement arising from a dispute between 
Cameroon and Nigeria. The dictum of this case, he remarks was invoked by the Simon Brown 
LJ in the matter before the Court of Appeal, with which Goodwin-Gill was principally 
concerned in his article.  The citation reads “Although the principle of good faith is ‘one of 
the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligation…it is not in 
itself a source of obligation where none would otherwise exist’” (102).  Now whilst the 
citation is correct, it is in fact a compound of two previous dictum by the ICJ in two separate 
cases.  The recognition that good faith is “one of the basic principles governing the creation 
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and performance of legal obligation” was first drawn by the Court in the Nuclear Tests26
 
 case 
and was reiterated in the Armed Activities case. The significance is that in that latter 
judgement, the citation from the Nuclear Tests case is followed by a semi-colon, before the 
court, in the Armed Activities case, then remarked “it is not in itself a source of obligation 
where none would otherwise exist”. In this light, I think it safe to view that comment then as a 
qualification to the basic principle. Now if I am right in that contention, this may be 
significant for the purpose of the subject under analysis here, because as we saw earlier Kant 
argued that the effect of lex permissiva is that it grants or authorises the existence of an 
obligation where one would not otherwise exist. Whilst there is a slight variation in the 
language, the parallel between Kant’s remark and the ICJ dictum are striking. And striking for 
this reason: lex permissiva is itself a source of obligation where none would otherwise exist. 
Arguably therefore permissive laws qualify the principle of good faith. One might wish to 
contend contra Goodwin-Gill who opines “Good faith regulates the area between the 
permissible and the clearly impermissible” (p.100), rather whether that which is permissible 
can be said to regulate the purview of good faith. 
We can now turn to the dichotomy amnesties may be thought to present, both in terms of 
good faith obligations under treaties or agreements specifically, or international legal 
obligations generally. Taking Goodwin-Gill’s description of the principle above one might 
ask whether to rescind an amnesty (in anticipation of prosecution) is breaching the obligation 
to abstain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a Treaty27, or whether the 
granting of an amnesty is in some way inconsistent with a state’s other obligations under 
international law28
 
 such as jus cogens or obligations erga omnes, both of which might be 
viewed as on the impermissible or in bad faith.  
One need only look to the definitions and commentaries to be found in the Restatement of the 
Law The Foreign Relations Law of the United States published by the American Law Institute 
                                                 
26 The complete paragraph from which the quote is regularly drawn reads “One of the basic principles 
governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. 
Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age when this co-operation in 
many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties 
is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral 
declaration. Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place 
confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obligation thus created be respected.” (Nuclear Tests ICJ 
Reports 1974, p.268 para 46; p.473, para. 49) 
27 Consider Article 18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
28 Consider Article 15 European Convention on Human Rights 
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in 1986, for a demonstration as to the impermissibility of acting contrary to jus cogens. 
Considered peremptory norms of international law that is to say they are expected to be 
thought of as without challenge, the text reads at §102 “k.  Peremptory norms of international 
law (jus cogens).  Some rules of international law are recognized by the international 
community of states as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and 
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them. 
Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent norm of international 
law having the same character.” (1986, 28) Permitting no derogation might raise the question 
as to whether these rules might be thought axiomatic, in which case they would share that 
characteristic with Koskenniemi’s axiomatic derivation of public power from consent. One 
may be tempted to ask; what are the consequences of granting of amnesty if such is contrary 
to jus cogens, given the rule is said to prevail over and invalidate treaties contrary to its 
principle. And in order to act contrary to the norm one is only permitted in doing so by virtue 
of a norm of like nature. This permissible capacity for modification may however provide the 
solution, particularly in terms of atrocity law, if one posits the view that the notion that crimes 
so atrocious ought not go unpunished is itself a peremptory norm. 
 
I will return to the issue of peremptory norms and non-derogation in the fifth chapter.  For 
now it is worth noting that the characteristic of a peremptory norm can now be found in Art 
53 and 64 of Vienna Convention. Whilst to be peremptory the norm needs, of necessity, to be 
“accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a whole”29
 
 that such is 
in reality not universal consensus rather consensus amongst “a very large majority”. 
Reflecting on Simmons’ comment that “The legal system (in stable societies) needs only 
general compliance to function at peak efficiency, not universal compliance” (127) it is 
evidently possible and of practical necessity for there to be variance in peremptory norms, 
even in the face of dissent, although the dissent clearly must be in the minority.  Were there 
not such possibility nothing would be practically achieved for want of universal consent. 
Now having identified the contention that the rescission of amnesty would seem an anathema 
to the principle pacta sunt servanda, and may indeed be contrary to the object and purpose of 
the treaty itself, I will turn to the next inevitable question. Are there circumstances in which 
one can act contrary to that fundamental principle? The answer, perhaps not surprisingly, is 
                                                 
29 See Article 53 and Reporters’ note p.34 Restatement of the Law Third 
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maybe, in certain, contingent circumstances. With the exception of a treaty being deemed 
invalid fifteen articles of the Vienna Convention provide for circumstances in which one may 
denounce, terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty (Aust, 2000, 224). I will not consider 
those provisions in detail here, but illustrate them to draw note to the fact that acts contrary to 
the intention to be bounds by the terms of the treaty in perpetuity are envisaged and one might 
suggest are indicative of parallels between treaty extent and the Lockean and Gentilian 
notions of the limit to which one can consent to be bound in domestic terms.   
  
Consent to be bound  
 
That the principle pacta sunt servanda is consensually based is, of course, problematic, for as 
equally as we may choose to agree, we may equally choose to disagree. As Shaw remarks, 
“To accept consent as the basis for obligation in international law begs the question as to what 
happens when consent is withdrawn.  The state’s reversal of its agreement to a rule does not 
render that rule optional or remove from it its aura of legality.  It merely places that state in 
breach of its obligations under international law if that state proceeds to act upon its decision.  
Indeed, the principle that agreements are binding (pacta sunt servanda) upon which all treaty 
law must be based cannot itself be based upon consent.” (1997, 9)  Fortunately, Shaw equally 
remarks, that it is equally not possible to ignore the issue of consent in international law and 
“[t]o recognise its limitations is not to neglect its significance” (Ibid). A notion can be equally 
incomplete, yet pervasive. Furthermore, as we have indicated above, consent need neither be 
absolute nor universal. 
 
In the history of law the promulgation of agreements of an international nature led positivist 
legal theory to divide into two camps. Shaw again, “The monists claimed that there was one 
fundamental principle which underlay both national and international law. This was variously 
posited as ‘right’ or social solidarity or the rule that agreements must be carried out (pacta 
sunt servanda). The dualists, more numerous and in a more truly positivist frame of mind, 
emphasised the element of consent” (25). Amongst the leading monist, that is to say that 
national and international law are part of the same system of law, was Kelsen. Shaw critiques 
Kelsen’s view as too rigid, and finds potential tautologies in the fact that states ought to 
behave as they tend (customarily) to behave and thus ought to obey the rules that they obey 
(41). 
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The passage, of which Shaw is critical, is from Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State. In 
explaining the “Basic Norm of International Law” Kelsen sequences his argument thus 
1. Begin with the lowest norm, the decision of an international court 
2. Why is the norm created by the court valid? Because of the international treaty in 
accordance with which the court was instituted (constituted) 
3. Why is the treaty valid? Because of pacta sunt servanda (in Kelsen’s words “the 
general norm which obligates the states to behave in conformity with the treaties 
they have concluded”) 
4. “This is a norm of general international law and general international law is 
created by custom constituted by acts of States” (italics mine) 
5. The basic norm of international law, therefore, must be a norm which 
countenances custom as a norm-creating fact, and might be formulated as follows: 
“The States ought to behave as they have customarily behaved”.  Customary 
international law, developed on this basis of this norm is the first stage within the 
international legal order.” (1967, 369)  
 
In referring to Kelsen, Nussbaum summarises his position on international law thus, “Kelsen 
attributes binding force above all to international custom. From the latter, binding force of 
treaties is derived: pacta sunt servanda is in itself a customary rule. The binding character of 
international custom constitutes the initial hypothesis (Grundnorm) which is inherent in any 
legal system, but which cannot be subjected to further legal analysis; hence Kelsen…declines 
to answer the fundamental question why custom is binding.” (1947, 286) 
 
One attempt to answer such a question may be, paradoxically, to contend that custom, in the 
same way as conventional law is binding, creates an obligation by the very consent given in 
submitting to be bound.  This is the synonymy I have been seeking to illuminate throughout 
the comparison I have drawn thus far between quod principi placuit and pacta sunt servanda. 
 
Now the difficulty with this contention, some might argue is that if consent is all that is 
required to create obligation, one can simply decide not to offer one’s consent and in doing so 
remove the obligation under which one had placed oneself. Of course if everyone chose such 
a view, anarchy is the logical and inevitable conclusion. The reason why everyone does not 
adopt such a course is, I would suggest that necessity overrides volition. In order for society 
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to subsist and sustain, there is a need that people can and do live in concert. The premise of 
that concert is the recognition of obligation.   
 
However, having demonstrated I hope the basis for the recognition, in terms of amnesty we 
need to look for a means by which that recognition can be both sustained and yet excepted 
from, and to do so in a permissible manner. To attempt an answer to this conundrum, I will 
turn now to Kant and his notion of permissive laws. 
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3. 
 
AMNESTY AND PERMISSION 
 
Introduction  
 
In the introduction we saw that Kelsen discuss his pure theory as following, or drawing from 
the methodology of Kant.  We might equally suggest that the connection can be disputed my 
reason in considering Kant does not turn singularly on that relationship purported or 
otherwise.30
 
The reason is rather that his theory and its explication offers I consider a 
sustainable argument to maintain the legal permissibility of amnesty. 
To permit an act is to indicate that you allow an individual to behave, or who has behaved, in 
such a way that consequences, which might otherwise ordinarily follow, will not do so on this 
occasion because the individual acts under the authority of permission. To suggest that act 
needs permission implies that in the absence of such permission it would be unpermitted, or 
illicit. I wish to stress that the significance of the issue at hand is not the permitted/not 
permitted dichotomy per se but rather the concern of how and why and conceivably when, 
laws are needed that permit action.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the concept of amnesty can be suggested 
as illustrative of Kant’s notion of permissive law (lex permissiva). Such a determination will 
rest on two issues. What permissive laws might generally be thought to be and what Kant 
used to illustrated his idea of them. I shall take the second issue as my principal concern in 
this chapter.   
 
By way of preliminaries however it is worth noting that law is generally thought to be 
concerned with obligation, though much debate could be had about the role obligation has 
with regard to obeying the law. Laws are often said to be prescriptive31
                                                 
30 See Alida Wilson Is Kelsen Really a Kantian (Tur and Twining, 1986, 37ff)  and Hillel Steiner Kant’s 
Kelseniansim  (Tur and Twining, 1986, 65ff)  
and prohibitive or 
proscriptive. The former obliges that we act in a certain way the latter that we don’t act in a 
31 Although similar in many senses, it is not always the same as the when prescriptive as used as the alternative 
to descriptive in logic. 
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particular way.  Laws in that sense are dos and don’ts. Before turning to what Kant used to 
illustrate his concept of lex permissiva let us first consider his remarks about permission and 
its relation to law for these explain the point I have just made and properly situate Kant’s 
subsequent use of lex permissiva. 
 
When describing the “Rudimentary concepts of the Metaphysics of Morals (Philosophica 
practica universalis)” (1999, 14f), Kant describes a number of concepts common to his 
metaphysics of morals. For the purposes of the extant discussion I wish to concern myself 
with the descriptions he provides to obligation, permitted actions and duty.  The concepts of 
obligation, permission and duty are central to the subsequent development in this paper of 
deontological, teleological and deontic conceptions of amnesty, which will follow in the next 
chapter.  “Obligation” Kant describes, “is the necessity of a free action under a categorical 
imperative”. And in his following remarks considers “[a]n imperative is a practical rule 
through which an action, in itself contingent, is made necessary” (15). Practicality, 
contingency and necessity are all it seems, in Kant, pertinent to the determination of 
obligation: “An action is permitted (licitum) if it is not opposed to obligation, and this 
freedom that is not limited by any opposing imperative is called entitlement (facultas 
moralis)” (16). We are entitled therefore to act in a permitted or licensed way.  “Hence it is 
obvious what is meant by unpermitted (illicitum)” (Ibid). When opposed to obligation we are 
not so entitled to act.  Thereafter Kant reaches his conclusion; “Duty is that action to which a 
person is bound.  It is therefore the content [Materie] of obligation” (Ibid). 
  
Kant thus recognised the inextricable link between obligation, permission and right.  The title 
of the notion which Kant considered indicative of permissive law was the Postulate of 
Practical Reason with Regard to Rights (40). In order to properly explore and explain the 
contention I suggest it is necessary to review, in at least some details, elements of Kant’s first 
two Critiques both of which precede32
                                                 
32 Critique of Pure Reason (1st Ed. 1781, 2nd 1787) Critique of Practical Reason (1788) Metaphysics of Morals 
(1797).  It should similarly be noted that the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals, to which the Second 
Critique has a significant relation dates from 1785. 
 his Metaphysics of Morals, in the first book of which 
Kant’s example of lex permissiva is to be found. It is through such an appreciation of the 
genesis of lex permissiva located, I suggest, in the discussions undertaken in the Second and 
informed by the First Critique, that it is then appropriate to relate permissive laws beyond the 
realm of proprietary rights, or rights of ownership – the manner in which Kant considered it.  
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It may be suggested that such extension is not necessary for, in the context of the extant 
discussion, of amnesty for the power to confer and rescind such depends on ownership in the 
sense of possession of the power to legislate. If however one holds the view that what Kant 
was actually talking about was physical possession of a tangible object, such as a property, 
then I will contend that Kant concerns himself not only with the law of property, but with the 
property of law.  
 
We will see Kant’s view is that the postulate can be called a permissive law of practical 
reason. This is so because it grants either an authorisation or entitlement that mere concepts of 
right or justice would not confer, namely that there are under an obligation, which they would 
not otherwise be under, not to interfere with our property for we are the first to have taken 
possession of them. The first part of the sentence I suggest attends to the property of law, the 
second the law of property. The purpose and intent of the permissive law is to authorise, 
entitle, licence or permit us to impose obligations on others where such obligations do not 
exist. The latter part of that sentence is in one respect common to all laws, be they 
proscriptive, prescriptive or permissive. All laws will impose an obligation that did not 
otherwise exist, if they did not they would be otiose. However in terms of permissive laws it 
is the authorisation to act rather than the imposition of the obligation that is operative.   
 
It may well be in this sense that the author on whom I will greatly rely, Reinhard Brandt, 
sought to distinguish permissive from proscriptive or prescriptive laws. It may be prudent at 
the outset to make clear Brandt’s principal point which, as translated, was to view “permissive 
laws as laws that provisionally authorise actions which are, strictly speaking prohibited” 
(Flikschuh, 2000, 117).  Whether such view accords with a more general understanding of 
permissive laws I will look to at the end of this chapter.  Brandt’s work was thought by 
Flikschuh an important paper on the postulate and indeed she acknowledged her debt to him 
in her subsequent discussion.  Tierney thought the paper “pathbreaking” (2001b, 381).  I will 
likewise adopt Brandt’s interpretation although in terms of the question of amnesty I would 
shorten his point to contend that permissive laws can be simply considered as contingent 
exceptions.   
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Exception and contingency 
 
I intentionally use these two words for the following purpose.  Contingency, as I will argue is 
pivotal to an understanding of the contemporary view of the purpose and practice of amnesty. 
This theme will also resonate in chapters 4 and 5. We will see evident from both Brandt’s 
view and Flikschuh’s interpretation that contingency is essential to a proper comprehension of 
permissive laws. Related, if not synonymous to this concept of contingency is that whilst an 
amnesty will be demonstrated as contingent in its application it is also necessarily provisional 
in it effect. There must be amnesty from something and it must be for a limited duration or 
else it would simply become the norm. To talk of exception necessarily implies the prior 
existence of a rule. The issue of priority is similarly fundamental to grasping the purpose and 
consequence of amnesty. 
 
On a simple analysis one could easily suggest that amnesty is a permissive law for it too, on 
one view, could be said to provisionally authorise actions which are, strictly speaking 
prohibited. However the first problem one faces in such a statement is tense. Amnesties apply 
to acts which have passed; they are by their very nature retroactive. They are not proposed as 
prospective. That is not to say that one might not act in contemplation of a prospective 
amnesty. Indeed such contemplation may to some degree lie at the heart of those acting with a 
sense of impunity in anticipation of the possibility of subsequent amnesty. There are of course 
those who will suggest that those acting with impunity tend to be so confident of the basis of 
their impunity, for they control the levers of power, that they need not give a second thought 
to amnesty. That is of course feasible, but for fear of being distracted from the focus of 
amnesty, I shall simply contend that equally feasible is to act with impunity, conceiving the 
possibility that impunity may one day as a result of a shift in power become amnesty. The 
provisional nature of the authorising is similarly problematic if one takes the view as outlined 
at the beginning of this study of the intention of amnesty as having an oblivious rather than 
provisional effect. The idea of amnesty as oblivion, as the paper will illustrate, is no longer 
readily acknowledged.  Indeed if one thinks what amnesty in a contemporary practice is it is 
evidentially provisional, rather than what it what once thought that it ought to be, oblivion. 
 
On one view then, amnesty cannot be a permissive law for the former relates to excusing acts 
that have passed, whilst the latter it may be argued, given its tense, permits an action yet to 
come.   
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However the contrary view, I wish to advocate, is that by properly understanding what Kant 
meant lex permissiva to be and what Brandt considers the extent and arena to which such laws 
should and would apply enables amnesty to be viewed as a permissive law and therefore 
practiced as a contingent exception, that is, as a means by which to depart from a law’s 
validity, that is to say applicability, whilst not ultimately affecting the premise of a law per se, 
the legal system and its continued validity. And, as we have seen the notion of validity can be 
thought of as related to efficacy. 
 
 I will now turn to explore first some of Kant’s interpreters and their explanations of a 
postulate to inform the relationship of Kant’s concepts of practical reason to the idea of 
amnesty. Having conducted this review I will return to Brandt’s interpretation in further 
illustrate the relationship in order to identify amnesty as a permissive law. 
  
What is a Postulate? 
 
A number of different commentators on Kant have given views on the definition of a 
postulate. Lewis White Beck (1960) in his commentary to the Critique gives Kant’s definition 
of a postulate as “a theoretical proposition which is not as such demonstrable, but which is an 
inseparable corollary of an unconditionally valid practical law” sees a postulate in philosophy 
“is an assertion of the possibility or actuality of an object as a corollary to the 
acknowledgement of a necessary law” and indicates “[t]he practical proposition is the law (or 
rather its associated imperative); the postulate is a theoretical proposition, but it is not a 
proposition that is theoretically (i.e., apodictically) certain” (252). Kant’s own view is that “a 
postulate of pure practical reason (by which I understand a theoretical proposition, though 
not one demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori 
unconditionally valid practical law)” (1997, 102). Ladd relies on and quotes L.W. Beck’s 
translation of 1956, (Kant, 1999, 47 n18). I cite these definitions for Flikschuh suggests 
Brandt’s interpretation of permissive laws, given above, allows him to offer explanations of 
“Kant’s obscure references to the postulate as an ‘a priori extension of pure practical reason’”. 
(2000, 117) 
 
Another description offered as to the nature of Kant’s three practical postulates by the editors 
of is that Early Political Writings of the German Romantics “these ideas are ‘postulates in the 
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sense that, although reason cannot demonstrate them to be true, it can justify belief in them 
for the purposes of moral conduct”. Or again that “practical reason provides grounds for 
assuming the reality of certain metaphysical ideas which could not be established 
theoretically” (Beiser 1996, 3n1).   
 
The last two of these interpretations also being the most succinct I find the most helpful in the 
sense that they can, for example, easily be applied to comprehend the notion of the 
grundnorm (or basic norm) in Kelsen. If one accepts the view that the grundnorm, whilst not 
demonstrable is nonetheless justifiable, and thus effective, in providing a basis for all other 
norms upon which and to which laws are to be measured, then the grundnorm can be accepted 
in the same manner as other postulates. It may be unreasonable, yet it is justifiable to maintain 
a belief in the grundnorm, for the purpose of (the regulation of) moral conduct, by amongst 
other means, norms or laws. 
   
The consequence of the review of these descriptions of what a postulate is in Kant is that, in 
order to maintain that amnesty is a permissive law I need to demonstrate that it satisfies the 
criteria of a postulate of practical reason. To enable me to sustain this argument it is necessary 
that I discuss first the relationship and significance to practical reason as both a basis and 
consequence of postulates proposed.  
 
Practical Reason 
 
The purpose of “postulates of pure practical reason” is that practical reason provides grounds 
for assuming the reality of certain metaphysical ideas which could not be established 
theoretically. However the consequence of relying on such a postulate is that it can inform our 
actions when premised on an assumption or set of assumptions, which whilst not 
demonstrable are nonetheless accepted as reliable for the further purpose of guiding conduct. 
One may be inclined to avoid use of the word faith, given it religious connotation, however, 
descriptions offered of such reliance is that it is “reasonable faith” or “rational faith”. In one 
sense it is a belief which whilst not demonstrably evident none the less makes sense to 
maintain.  By elucidating Kant’s arguments what I hope to illustrate is how that maintenance 
becomes sustainable. Such sustainability it may be succinctly argued is a result of it appearing 
to be right or appearing to “fit”.  Appearances, as the adage goes, can be deceptive.  However, 
and this may be the key point to the discussion at hand is that notwithstanding the deception 
41 
 
(conscious of it or not) we are prepared, for practical purposes, to accept the appearance of 
right.  Certainty secedes to practicality.   
  
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant saw three postulates of practical reason; the 
immortality of the soul, freedom and the existence of God.  He explains that “These postulates 
are not theoretical dogmas by presuppositions having a necessarily practical reference and 
thus, although they do not extend speculative cognition, they give objective reality to the 
ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their reference to what is practical) and 
justify its holding concepts even the possibility of which it could not otherwise presume to 
affirm” (1997, 110) 
 
The remainder of this chapter will concern itself with the question as to whether amnesty 
properly fits within that description and in doing so seek to reinforce Brandt’s contention, in 
the sense that it fits in permitting that which is otherwise prohibited. 
 
Kant begins Part one of Book one of the Critique of Practical Reason with his definition on 
principles of pure practical reason; “Practical principles are propositions that contain a 
general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, 
or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject as holding only for his will; but they 
are objective, or practical laws, when the condition is cognized as objective, that is, as holding 
for the will of every rational being” (Ibid, 17). In his work on Kant’s categorical imperative, 
Williams cites this paragraph in a footnote to two similar paragraphs in the Groundwork. He 
surmises Kant’s position thus, “while objective principles, or laws, express how men ought to 
decide to act, maxims are simply rules on which men do, in fact, act” (1968, 14). In that sense 
Kant could be said to identify the is/ought dichotomy. The consequence of such conclusion is 
that maxims do not necessarily accord with morality, as compared with practical laws.  
Williams continues to explicate thereafter the distinction between maxims, which he describes 
as ‘material’, or ‘formal’ which we feel either inclined to follow or consider under a duty to 
follow (Ibid, 20f).     
 
Kant’s fundamental law of pure practical reason “So act that the maxim of your will could 
always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of universal law” (1997, 28) is a 
reflection of his categorical imperative. He explains how we comprehend this and how as a 
result of a realisation of it demonstrates its fundamentalism “Consciousness of this 
42 
 
fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one cannot reason it out from 
antecedent data of reason for example, from consciousness of freedom (since freedom is not 
antecedently given to us)” (Ibid). We saw earlier that freedom was one of Kant’s postulates of 
practical reason, and therefore we are entitled to accept its premise, not withstanding it is not 
capable of empirical verification. Kant recognises such in his cautionary note with which he 
ends his remark to the fundamental law “However, or order to avoid misinterpretation in 
regarding this law as given it must be noted carefully that it is not an empirical fact but the 
sole fact of pure reason which, by it, announces itself as originally lawgiving (sic volo, sic 
jubeo)” (29). The citation in Latin is intriguing for our purposes for as the editor notes it is 
taken from the Roman Juvenal’s Satire 6; What I will, I command. (29 n j). A sentiment that 
might be said to resonates in Schmitt, and some interpretations refuted in chapter 2.  
 
The Corollary which Kant draws to his fundamental law is perhaps amongst the most succinct 
iteration of the basis of the Enlightenment project; “Pure reason is practical of itself and gives 
(to the human being) a universal law which we call the moral law” (29) Reason thus becomes 
the cornerstone for practical morality. 
 
The basis upon which postulates rest has been described, dependent upon the translation of 
the German Vernunftglaube, as variations of reasonable or rational and faith or belief, (glaube 
may be either of the latter terms). The term reasonable faith John Rawls thought best to reflect 
the idea of faith supported by reason (cited in Kant, 1997 n6 xiv). The idea that it is 
acceptable to rely on such a premise can perhaps best be garnered from the use to which Kant 
puts it in referring to another postulate of practical reason, the existence of God. Before 
turning to that we would do well to note before immediately examining that concept in the 
second Critique, Kant deals with the first of his postulates, the immortality of the soul.  
Before reaching his conclusion that “the highest good is practically possible only on the 
presupposition of the immortality of the soul” (102), he explains the progressive nature of 
moral action. For Kant, the highest good, morality, is only attainable in “holiness” which is in 
“complete conformity” with the “dispositions of the moral law”, which “can be fully 
accomplished only in an eternity, it led to the postulate of immortality” (104). The purpose of 
practical action then is that it must strive for the highest good and must do so in “endless 
progress to that complete conformity” (102). In that sense whilst unattainable in practical 
physical terms, acting as we ought to in order to continue in an endless progression towards 
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the highest good, morality is necessary for “[t]he production of the highest good in the world 
is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law” (102). 
 
In his introduction to the Gregor translation of the Critique of Practical Reason, Reath 
summarises Kant’s argument as to the postulates of pure practical reason and their 
relationship to the moral law that the “generates a duty to do all we can to bring about the 
highest good, which for now we may understand as the state of affairs in which the ends of 
mortality are realized in their totality.” (Kant 1997, xiv) The issue of the “ends of morality” is 
one rife with contention, both in a generic and specific sense.  I will not consider that here 
suffice to say that the duty referred to can perhaps be thought of as that which we ought to do. 
Reath continues to explain the relationship thus; “But the only way in which we can regard 
the highest good as a practical possibility is by assuming the immortality of the soul and the 
existence of God as a moral author of the universe who has ordered the world so as to support 
the ends of mortality. Since the duty to make the highest good is unconditional, it licenses 
[permits] us to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, as conditions of 
the practical possibility of the highest good” (Ibid). 
 
As I have already dealt with the postulate of the immortality of the soul, that it may be 
postulated given the eternal nature of progression toward “complete conformity”, I will turn 
now to the second postulate. In short, it is necessary to postulate the existence of God for the 
possibility of the highest good, which Kant established the duty to strive for, “can therefore be 
postulated, while our reason finds this thinkable only on the presupposition of a supreme 
intelligence; to assume the existence of this supreme intelligence is thus connected with the 
consciousness of our duty” (105). Kant goes on to explain that in a theoretical context such an 
assumption to explain its existence is can be considered a hypothesis. However, and this is the 
significant point, with regard to the highest good, and because to fulfil then practical necessity 
of action “it can be called belief and, indeed, a pure rational belief since pure reason alone (in 
its theoretical as well as in its practical use) is the source from which it springs.” (105). As we 
saw earlier, it is as a practical tool, a guide towards action as opposed to theory that we are 
entitled to maintain a belief or faith in that which is postulated.   
 
What is indicative therefore of all the postulates of pure practical reason as we saw earlier is 
their “having a necessarily practical reference” (110). Kant explains the specific necessities in 
relation to each of the postulates, immortality, freedom and the existence of God thus; 
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“The first flows from the practically necessary condition of a duration befitting the complete 
fulfilment of the moral law”.  An eternity is necessary in order to reach the highest good. 
“[T]he second from the necessary presupposition of independence from the sensible world 
and of the capacity to determine one’s will by the law of an intelligible world, that is, the law 
of freedom”. We must be free in order to ‘be able to will’, the very premise of moral 
judgment.  We must have the ability, not be disabled by exterior determination.  “[T]he third 
from the necessity of the condition for such an intelligible world to be the highest good, 
through the presupposition of the highest independent good, that is, of the existence of God” 
(Ibid). It is necessary that there must be a summit, to which reference is to be made to 
determine the height towards which we should strive in fulfilling our duty to the moral law or 
else we would not know in which direction to aim our ascent. 
 
In responding to potential critiques of the premises upon which the postulates lie, Kant 
indicates that whilst we are not cognisant of them we are warranted in assuming them for the 
practical purposes of directing our will and thus action.  It is for this reason that Kant looks to 
the moral law in its practical rather than ephemeral aspect; “[t]he moral law is…for the will of 
a perfect being a law of holiness, but for the will of every rational being a law of duty, of 
moral necessitation and of a determination of his actions through respect for this law and 
reverence for his duty” (70).  The determination derives from the actor’s subjective 
recognition, demonstrable by respect and reverence, and not from any other impulse. 
 
The Erlaubnisgesetz and translating the Postulate 
 
In translation the German noun erlaubnis is to permit or to licence, and permission, gesetz, 
law.  That Kant meant by the term Erlaubnisgesetz a law that licences or permits would seem 
to be without doubt both in his use of the German and that he follow this term with lex 
permissiva in parenthesis. 
 
However, one should not ignore the significance of differences in the translations of the 
Postulate.  
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In the Gregor translation is with regard to Rights (Kant 1997, 40)33, (the German title reads 
Rechtliches Postulat der pratischen Vernunft (AA, p.246)34) whereas Tierney (seemingly 
following Gregor) cites the Postulate as with regard to Right (2001a, 304) and Flikschuh 
follows suit (2000, 113).  Rights are phenomenal, Right, noumenal35.  By describing 
something in the plural, such takes it from abstraction (concept) to the empirical (factual, or 
more correctly, actual). It also, I would argue, implies possession. People are able to acquire 
rights (or a right); however they do not acquire Right. This point could be of singular import; 
for what Flikschuh sees as the antinomy of Right, the solution to which she contends may be 
found in lex permissiva, is predicated by the question of how external objective, phenomenal 
possession is possible, which itself “resolves itself into the question” of how rightful, 
intelligible, noumenal possession is possible, and how such is compatible with the universal 
principle of Right. This distinction, which I feel should be made, is necessary because of the 
nature of the antinomy of Right, as “all of the antinomies share certain methodological 
features”, which are, that they “take the form of a dispute between a thesis and antithesis, 
where the thesis always represents a generalised rationalist position, while the antithesis 
always defends a generalised empirical position” (59). Now the question is whether noumenal 
is consanguineous with rational, phenomenal with empirical, the former being capable of 
apprehension only by intuition, the latter by observation. A proper exposition of this 
discussion goes far beyond the scope of this paper. I nonetheless thought it prudent to at the 
very least illustrate the significance of the variations in translations for the grant or rescission 
of amnesty may well relate to question of whether that is the right thing to do or if it infringes 
the rights of others.36
 
 
In Ladd (Kant 1999) the translation reads, with regard to the necessity of there being different 
meanings to the concept of possession (42) as “sensible possession and intelligible 
possession.” And possession “[u]nder the first sense is to be understood the physical 
possession of the object and under the second sense a purely juridical possession”. This 
qualification correlates sensible with physical (or objective, phenomenal) and intelligible with 
juridical. In the Ladd text lex permissiva is the “Juridical Postulate of Practical Reason”. One 
                                                 
33 Gregor describes the title generically in her footnotes as Rechtliches Postulat and in her translation notes 
remarks on rechtlich as used by Kant as an adjective (amongst others) of Recht (see p.xxxv) 
34 In his essay Brandt (1982) refers to and cites as either “rechtliche Postulat der praktischen Vernunft oder 
Erlaubnisgesetz (lex permissiva) der praktischen Vernunft” (p.233). 
35 Cf as analogous Steiner when in posing “the question as to whether there can be a theory – in Kant’s sense of 
the term – law, as such. Do laws inhabit the phenomenal or noumenal world?” (in Tur and Twining, 1986,  66)  
36Although I will touch on the issue of amnesty as the derogation from rights in Chapter 5, this will not address 
the issue of whether amnesties are right in the moral sense. Cf Wellman (May, 2008)  
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may interpret the German adjective rechtlich as legal, judicial. The intention then would seem 
to relate the postulate to the noumenal realm, of Right, rather than the phenomenal realm of 
Rights. 
 
The Brandtian view – political and provisional  
 
Thus far I have sought to illustrate the nature of a postulate of practical reason and to some 
degree consider how amnesty might be reflective of that.  In so doing I have begun my 
contention that amnesty may be considered a permissive law and as such a postulate of 
practical reason. As a permissive law we can explain how it is to be distinguished from other 
forms of law, and, as a postulate of practical reason, explain it the practical purpose upon 
which its legitimacy, or perhaps efficacy, is based (the latter potentially being the virtue by 
which it attains and sustains legitimacy and capacity for distinction). I will now turn to the 
author whose conclusions may be most illustrative and supportive of my contention that 
amnesty is lex permissiva. 
 
Brandt refers in his paper to other authors’ views of permissive law, both contemporary and 
historical. He cites the following passage from Gregor’s Laws of Freedom “A permissive law 
states the conditions under which a general prohibition does not apply, and the permission to 
prohibit others from interfering with our exclusive use of an object is a limitation upon the 
prohibition, contained in the inherent right of freedom, against interfering with the freedom of 
others” (58, 239f in Brandt). The nature of the conditions to which Gregor refers, is, it seems 
to me the matter with which Brandt, and similarly Flikschuh, in her comments on his work, 
are concerned. 
 
It is worth recognising that Brandt acknowledges the historical heritage of permissive law. In 
the notes to his essay, Brandt refers to Hugo Grotius and Joachim Georg Darjes37
                                                 
37 Twenty-sixth observation (de jure naturali permissivo) in his work, Observationes juris naturalis socialis et 
gentium. 
. Darjes’ 
work was written in 1751 and is the subject of short consideration in Tierney’s later essay on 
the provenance of lex permissiva up to Kant. Tierney (2001b) explains, likewise, that for 
some medieval lawyers the idea of permissive law was certainly not new and indeed may 
offer a way out of the apparent impasse arising from contradictions between or inabilities to 
reconcile the concept of natural right with the principles of natural law. An interpretation was 
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that law is both permissive and preceptive (or prescriptive) as well as prohibitive and punitive.  
Huguccio (c.1190) offered the following suggestion; “By the law of nature something is mine 
and something is yours, but this is by permission not by precept, for divine law never 
commanded that all things be common or that some things be private but it permitted that all 
things be common or some private and so by natural law something is common and 
something is private” (381f). This is perhaps not a surprising conclusion to be reached by a 
canonist, and yet reflects to some degree what Kant will argue six centuries later.  
 
Having recognised that laws may be thought of in three terms, prescriptive, proscriptive and 
permissive I will turn to consider how permissive laws may be thought of as a resolution to 
the inevitable paradox that presents itself in the face of conflicting notions of right, or one 
might say of conflicting norms. 
 
Flikschuh, in her extensive essay on lex permissiva when reviewing the  dispute between the 
thesis and antithesis of the antinomy of Right, finds reconciliation of them analogous to the 
third antinomy in the Critique of Practical Reason (2000, 124). An antinomy, or paradox, is 
the outcome of the conflict between different views, both claiming valid conclusions in 
contradistinction to each, yet the basis for which view is an agreed premise. They start from 
the same point, head off in different directions and conclude in polarity. 
 
Let us first consider what I purport can be thought of as the paradoxical relationship between 
atrocity law and amnesty. In order to acquire binding force, both law and amnesty have to be 
derived from the source of a legitimate authority. Clearly the issue of legitimacy of authority 
is rife with difficulty, but for the purpose of my discussions, I will take it that, if the authority 
is legitimate then its pronouncements (of law or amnesty) are capable of acquiring binding 
force.  Now the fact that their binding force is derived from the same source satisfies the first 
criteria of the antinomy definition above, their divergence begins after the pronouncement of 
their effect from the legitimate authority.  Law in the sense of criminal and particularly 
atrocity law is proscriptive. Amnesty on the other hand, as I have sought to illustrate as an 
example of lex permissiva, is permissive. Their contradiction it would seem could not be 
starker. Whilst law demands accountability and subsequently requires sanction, amnesty 
excuses accountability and therefore denies sanction. Yet they both, to conclude the 
illustration of their paradoxical relationship, or their antinomy, claim validity.    
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Flikschuh expects “the antinomy of Right to be resolved through the formulation of a third 
perspective, which takes on board aspects of thesis and antithesis without fully endorsing 
either position.” (Ibid) This to some degree echoes both Brandt’s work in his sense of 
permissive law’s provisional nature and Kant’s predecessors, attention to which is drawn in 
Tierney’s review (2001b).  Flikschuh’s formal and substantive arguments are a critique of a 
paper by Kersting in which, she considers, when reaching his conclusion in favour of the 
thesis over antithesis, he errs in affording an affirmation of the postulate, extending to 
dominion, constituting a “transcendental relation of Right” and conferring on freedom of 
choice an absolutism of legal power. Flikschuh thinks this oversteps the mark. The postulate 
“only asserts that subjects’ claims to external objects of their choice cannot be contrary to 
Right” (2000, 128). 
 
A third alternative she looks for is to respond to the “two equally unpalatable alternatives”, by 
which “[e]ither we exercise our freedom of choice and accept our actions’ unavoidable effects 
on the possible choices of others, or we respect others’ equally valid claims to freedom and 
desist from exercising our freedom of choice and action” (135). The third alternative is, 
contingency.  By being contingent, actions will acquire permissibility consistent for purpose.  
In terms of the contemporary practice of amnesty, which I will argue is distinct from its 
absolutist predecessor, the notion of contingency, and as we shall see later, their being 
provisional is fundamental to its validity. Amnesties only now acquire their legitimacy as a 
consequence of their provisional contingency.38
                                                 
38 The legal validity of amnesties being predicated on their being provisional and contingent will be further 
illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5.   
 Indeed Flikschuh’s “principal argument…is 
that the postulate, a lex permissiva, offers a provisional solution to the antinomy of 
Right…the postulate makes possible a determinate solution to the problem of Right” (117). 
The basis of this solution is “grounded in subjects’ reflective recognition of their obligations 
of justice towards one another” (Ibid). And the sequence of Flikschuh’s argument as she 
herself makes clear “is from the conflict of Right to provisional Right, and from provisional 
Right to determinate, or peremptory Right” (Ibid). This sequence is of fundamental 
significance when one comes to apply it to law and norms. To align determinate with 
peremptory however can perhaps be confusing. The latter is an insistence on immediate 
attention, or obedience, the former that of exactness or discernible limits. Peremptory norms 
are those thought not subject to challenge. It may be that rather than determinate, Flikschuh 
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ought to talk of a determinative solution, for this implies direction, definition, qualification.  
That would offer a fairer description of the route from opacity to clarity that is sought.        
 
It may perhaps though be in the context of seeking to peer through the opaque that Flikschuh 
is considering Brandt’s characterisation of permissive laws as “dark preliminary judgements”.  
Either Flikschuh or Brandt have removed the comma from Kant’s original notes which Brandt 
cites, which could in their transcriptions have had the potential effect of evoking a sinister 
element which in Kant’s writing, given the location of the comma, in the original, was not, I 
believe, intended. Dark for Kant related to obscurity, an inability to perceive definitively, 
hence preliminary. That is why it reads ‘dark, preliminary’ and not ‘dark preliminary’.  
Admittedly Flikschuh identifies the evocative use of the latter, absent comma, iteration of 
Brandt and she properly, I think, concludes that Kant’s dark, preliminary judgements were 
“tentative attempts at practical political judgements” (139), intended, ironically perhaps, to 
illuminate our search for a determinate (or determinative) judgement. Kant is further cited in 
that “before embarking” one “will already have formed a preliminary judgement about his 
likely destination.  Preliminary judgements precede determinate judgements” (Ibid). The 
significance of this characterisation for the question of amnesty is though, perhaps, clear.  
This clarity is more evident, and particularly so, when we consider the arena to which Brandt 
saw permissive laws pertaining; the political.       
 
Amnesties could be said to serve “as provisionally valid principles of action with respect to 
political problems that stand in need of a solution but for which no solution readily presents 
itself…they count as provisionally just” (Ibid). The benefit of Brandt’s analysis is that as 
Flikschuh remarks it “hinges on his reading of the postulate as a type of practical judgement 
peculiar to the context of political agency” (136). This then makes it possible for me to 
contend its significance and relevance to amnesty in atrocity law, as an action of the political 
agent. That political agent is of course likewise, lawmaker. For it is in the capacity or 
potentiality to make laws that the power to suspend those laws, rests.  
 
I consider it satisfactory to adopt Brandt’s interpretation of lex permissiva for if one reads on 
in the text it is clearly feasible to see how he reached his conclusion. Kant wrote “permissive 
law…gives an authorisation that could not be got from mere concepts of right as such, namely 
to put all others under an obligation, which they would not otherwise have…” (Gregor 1996, 
41). And “Brandt has argued that the function of the lex permissiva is precisely to permit a 
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provisional violation of the universal principle of Right”39
 
 (Flikschuh 2000, 136). I would 
posit that from such an observation one would be justified in inferring that the very concept of 
lex permissiva must be inherent in the notion of amnesty.  The basis of this contention lies in 
the combination of the duty to seek the highest good and the possibility of permitting, 
provisionally, that which is otherwise prohibited. The suggestion of permissive laws is to 
argue that there are laws which would contradict other ordinary prohibitory norms or laws. 
This is what the notion of amnesty law implies, even though it may seem paradoxical.       
Flikschuh suggests “[i]n the sphere of law, permissive laws mediate between the prescriptive 
laws and the prohibitive laws of pure practical reason. Permissive laws apply to actions 
which, though not morally indifferent, cannot be classed either under obligatory actions or 
prohibited actions” (139). In this light it is easy to comprehend the nature of amnesty as a 
permissive law. Amnesty in effect places in abeyance the obligations the law would otherwise 
impose and delays the consequences of violating the prohibitions which the law otherwise 
provides.  
 
The next question to turn to is; Should amnesties be thought of as those acts which “strictly 
speaking are unlawful ‘a nevertheless honest’”? An action’s honesty, Flikschuh remarks, is 
because of the knowledge of the law not in spite (or despite) of it.  And further “unlawful 
acts…are none the less honestly committed because committing them is unavoidable under 
the circumstances” (137). The question of the unlawfulness or illegality of amnesty, may be 
questioned in relation to the honesty with which it may be intended. 
 
However the concordance of amnesty, with being unlawful, yet nevertheless honest, applied 
in a transitional manner as a possible solution to an otherwise impossible situation, in a 
political context, offers amnesty as that contingent solution (as an exception from rule) to the 
paradox of Right. And in this light amnesty cannot be considered anything but lex permissiva.  
Its contingency derives from its political efficacy, its exceptionality from its provisional 
effect, for “[p]ermissive laws count as provisionally just; they are valid in anticipation 
of...laws that do accord with the requirements of pure practical reason” (138). And thus if 
                                                 
39 The correspondence of permission, obligation and Right raises questions with regard to Kant’s ethics, often 
thought deontological.  The issue of deontology, teleology and deontic with regard to the question of amnesty 
will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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amnesties may well be interpreted as a permissive law they may well equally be provisionally 
legal, in the sense that they are legal valid. 
 
In order to maintain such an argument we need to explore in greater detail the relationship 
between ideas of duty or obligation, arguably informing, or informed by notions of Right and 
the concept of permission. In the next chapter I will consider that very issue as a question of 
deontic logic. 
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4. 
 
AMNESTY AS OUGHT 
 
“It has become a commonplace that most contemporary liberal theory is 
‘deontological’; that is, it gives priority to the right over the good.  This is in contrast 
to its utilitarian predecessors, which were ‘teleological’; that is, they gave priority to 
the good over the right.” (Kymlicka 1988, 173) 
 
Good and Right 
 
Will Kymlicka’s description above, following Rawls, provides me with a succinct comparison 
between the influences that are at play in the grant and rescission of amnesty.  The grant of 
amnesty it might be suggested is teleological, its rescission deontological.  Suffice to say that 
in maintaining such a position, the simplest explanation is that because the efficacy of 
granting amnesty can be measured in the “good” it offers in the cessation of hostilities it can 
be thought of as prioritising that good over the right of prosecuting perpetrators for the 
commission of crimes.  The deontological alternative is, of course, such prosecutions.   
 
This chapter will be centred on the following questions; is the grant, or rescission, of amnesty 
something which we ought to do? ; is it logical in certain circumstances or under certain 
conditions to make the possibility of amnesty, or its rescission, a fact?  And if so are we under 
an obligation to do that which we ought to do?   
 
It is worth noting in respect of the quotation above that, in comparison to teleology (the study 
or doctrine of final ends or causes and of special significance when related to the evidences of 
design or purpose is derived from the Greek τέλος, (telos) meaning simply end), deontology is 
drawn from the Greek τό δέον (to deon) meaning ‘that which is proper’ or ‘what ought to be’ 
(Kelsen, 1991, 73). The standard dictionary definition of deontology gives its etymology as 
from the Greek δέον δέοντ - that which is binding, duty - and describes it as the science of 
duty that branch of knowledge that deals with moral obligations: ethics.40
                                                 
40 All references to standard or dictionary definitions are to the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed,) (1991). 
 Bentham authored a 
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work entitled Deontology, wherein the first few pages he talks of “[d]eontology or Ethics” as 
synonymous41
 
(1983, 124). 
Now if one thinks of deontology as related to duty that is to say that which we ought to do, to 
understand it as an indication of obligation is to, arguably, says the same thing, and is 
tautologous. The philosophical comparative to ought is, is.  In the introduction to Kelsen’s 
essay collection, Weinberger considers that Kant’s philosophy of “the clear separation of 
judgement and norm of ‘is’ and ‘ought’”42 (1973, xiv) is clearly to be found in Kelsen’s work.  
And von Wright makes clear seeing if this gap can be bridged is of seminal import “to the 
question of whether norms can be true or false” (1985, 369).  This paper cannot do justice to 
the debate surrounding this issue and nor will I attempt to do so. I merely note these views to 
situate my discussion43
 
.   
If ethics are synonymous with deontology, on a etymological, if not Benthamite 
interpretation,  then one may think of ethics in terms of moral obligations and moral 
obligations equally as that which we ought to do.  Such a view however may then pose a 
dilemma or possible antinomy in terms of amnesty. As indicated, is granting or for that matter 
rescinding amnesty that which we ought to do and thus is there a moral or legal obligation to 
grant or rescind amnesties? 
 
Taking the opposition we have seen above it would seem that the paradox between the grant 
and rescission of amnesty in that it is irresolvable or impossible to reconcile the two notions:  
One where right is above good, the other vice versa. Clearly, as a matter of fact, granting and 
rescinding occur but accepting that fact is one thing, explaining it another.  What I intend in 
this chapter is to attempt to demonstrate a logically sound explanation for both the grant and 
the rescission.  If one were tempted to describe it in these terms what follows is an attempt to 
provide a logical justification for both actions. 
                                                 
41 It is of course necessary to be careful in reading too much into the synonymy for Bentham of course in the 
terms we are talking about is teleological rather than deontological in his authorship of the fundamental principle 
of utilitarianism; greatest happiness for greatness number  Hilpenen and Føllesdal also remarks however that 
Bentham’s use of ‘deontology’ is for “the science of morality” (Hilpinen, 1971, 1) 
42 The comparison of judgment and norm, or as we shall see later value and deontic, as much as its separation, is 
arguably central to my discussions that follow. 
43 One can go back to Hume’s infamous passage and consider more contemporaneously such seminal papers as 
John Searle’s How to Derive “Ought” from “Is” The Philosophical Review 73 (1964) 43-58 and Max Black’s 
The Gap between “Is” and “Should” The Philosophical Review 73 (1964) 164-181 both papers that von Wright 
(1985) responds to, see note 11 below.  
54 
 
Deontic Logic or the Logic of Norms 
 
The answer I suggest may be found in a field of logic which shares a direct etymological root 
as the description given to the science of duty above.  This field, part of modal logic, is the 
formal logic of deontic modalities (von Wright, 1951, 1), more succinctly described as 
Deontic Logic.  The latter term was the title of an article in 1951 by G.H. von Wright a paper 
which, it is suggested, has been the stimulus for much of the subsequent work in this field. 
(Hilpinen, 1971, 1). In light of that contention and given the limitations of space imposed on 
this paper, I shall limit my discussions of deontic logic and its application to the question of 
amnesty principally to some immediate responses to Von Wright’s 1951 paper, and his 
response, together with some later works by Von Wright spanning 40 years since his first 
excursion on the topic.      
 
The term deontic logic has however it seems a number of variations.  It is prudent, and will be 
beneficial to the arguments that follow to illustrate some of those variations.  Deontic logic 
has been described as a logic of obligation, logic of norms, logic of normative systems 
(Hilpinen, 1), a logic of conduct (Chisholm, 33) and a “logic of the will” (Hart, 112).44
The German philosopher Ernst Mally in 1926 wrote a work which, it is suggested the term 
deontic was first employed with regard to a logical study of language of normative 
expressions, such as obligation, duty, right and permission (Hilpinen, 1). In his work, 
Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens Mally’s concern was to present an 
 It has 
also been suggested the subject is “closely related to the logic of imperatives (or the logic of 
commands)” (Hilpinen, 1).  This latter description might be said to derive from a work earlier 
than that of Von Wright, on in which it is suggested the term deontic is first used in the sense 
with which we are concerned. 
                                                 
44 In his Essays on Bentham  Hart remarks,  “‘deontic’ logic which [Bentham] called the ‘logic of the will’” 
(1982,112;see Bentham 1970, 15 for his description as such logic being “in contradistinction to the...logic of the 
judgement and the footnote to Bentham reference which directs our attention to (1996, 299 n b2) is indicative of 
Bentham’s definition of law; “the idea of a law as an expression of the lawmaker’s volition” (p.111); “1. A law 
may be defined as an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by the sovereign in a 
state, concerning the conduct to be observed in a certain case by a certain person or class of persons, who in the 
case in question are or are supposed to be subject to his power: such volition trusting for its accomplishment to 
the expectation of certain events which it is intended such declaration should upon occasion be a means of 
bringing to pass, and the prospect of which it is intended should act as a motive upon those whose conduct is in 
question.” (Bentham, 1970, 1).  Hart also remarks on “[b]etween the legislator’s will...laws Bentham finds 
certain ‘necessary relations’ of...certain logical relationships of compatibility and incompatibility” and that these 
it was equally necessary to understand those relationships to understand the structure or system of laws.  To 
illustrate “these relationships Bentham developed and in fact discovered the foundations of imperative or 
‘deontic’ logic” (Hart 1982, 111f) 
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axiomatic system for the concept of ought. In their introduction Føllesdal and Hilpinen 
explain “[a]ccording to Mally, judging (Urteilen) and willing (Wollen) are two different 
attitudes towards states of affairs.  Classical logic is the logic of judgment; it lays down the 
criteria for correct and incorrect judgment.  Mally proposes to construct a similar logic for the 
attitude of willing that a state of affairs be the case.  This theory is termed ‘Deontik’45
 
.  A 
person willing that a given state of affairs p be the case may be expressed by sentences of the 
form ‘p ought to be (the case)’ (p soll sein).  This notion of ought is the deontic primitive of 
Mally’s system.” (Ibid, 1f.)  
Now consider what the same authors say of von Wright 1951 system “Von Wright’s approach 
to deontic logic is based upon the observation that there exists a significant (sufficient) 
analogy between the deontic notions obligation (ought) and permission and the modal notions 
necessity and possibility. Obligation and permission are related to each other in the same way 
as necessity and possibility: a proposition is necessary if and only if its negation is not 
possible, and similarly a state of affairs (or an act) p is obligatory if and only if ~ p is not 
permitted…The notion of permission is the deontic primitive of von Wright’s system.”(Ibid, 
8). 
 
This distinction of deontic primitives, a term I take to mean a if not the premise of each 
system, at least its fundamental tenet, can be illustrated by considering von Wright’s 
conclusion of obligation being derived from permission; “If an act is not permitted, it is called 
forbidden…if the negation of an act is forbidden, the act itself is called obligatory” (1951, 3).  
The example he provides “it is forbidden to disobey the law, hence it is obligatory to obey the 
law” (Ibid?) illustrates his argument of the analogous position described above.  The idea of 
the possibility of negation is of course pivotal to my discussion of amnesty as an exception 
from that which we are ordinarily obligated to obey.  And that negation is premised on 
permission, yet logically related to that which we ought and ought not to do. 
 
Now to contend that deontic logic is both a logic of will and a logic of norms is interesting 
when one seeks to compare the likes of Schmitt and Kelsen.  One, as we have seen, is 
                                                 
45 Von Wright (1968 11, n1) remarks on Broad’s suggestion to him, the etymology from Greek, Bentham’s and 
Mally’s use of deontology and deontik respectively. The online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy also noting 
Broad’s suggestion, says of both deontic and deontik,  “Both terms derive from the Greek term, δεον, for ‘that 
which is binding’, and ικ, a common Greek adjective-forming suffix for ‘after the manner of’, ‘of the nature of’, 
‘pertaining to’, ‘of’, thus suggesting roughly the idea of a logic of duty. (The intervening “τ” in “δεοντικ” is 
inserted for phonetic reasons.)” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/notes.html#1 
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illustrative of a will based notion of law (and its exception), the other, illustrative of attempts 
at founding a norm based system.  Von Wright considers Kelsen comparable to Weber and 
Marx for the depth of his influence on social science (1998, 365), and draws attention to 
a1953 paper in which Kelsen, indicating the impossibility of proceeding from an is to an 
ought, states such a “essential position of the Pure Theory of Law”.  Von Wright also quotes 
Kelsen’s claim that “the logic that the Pure Theory of Law was the first to discover, so to 
speak, is the general logic of norms, that is: a logic of Ought or of Ought-sentences” (Ibid, 
366).  The logic of ought or ought-sentences is yet another definition for deontic logic.  Von 
Wright sees Kelsen’s confidence in his assertion of having discovered Normenlogik as being 
partly founded on the influences of the debates to which he (von Wright) was instrumental 
during the 1950s.  Von Wright suggests that Kelsen is “a bit too egocentric” to attribute the 
discovery to his Pure Theory, but it is worth noting that the responses to von Wright’s 1951 
paper46
 
 that I have found, all post date Kelsen’s 1953 essay.  What is clear and will be shown 
when I come to consider some of Kelsen’s essays in the 1960s and parts of his last substantial 
work, General Theory of Norms is Kelsen’s concern to find logic in the law.    
Modes of Obligation 
 
What follows is an attempt to use the early debates in response to Von Wright’s 1951 paper to 
see if we can illustrate a logic to both the grant and rescission of amnesty.  Before turning to 
that issue a comment on my language seems appropriate.  Throughout this paper I use the 
verb, “grant” and the noun, “rescission”.  Now at the risk of further complicating the 
discussion, the former term is a description of an act, the latter an identification of a class of 
things.  Those things are the action of annulling or abrogating.  Now of course annulment or 
abrogation of law is precisely what the action of the grant of amnesty does so in those terms is 
it equally correct to talk of the rescission of laws by the act of amnesty as it is to talk of the 
rescission of amnesty by the act of law.    
 
Now this apparent divergence, I hope will now become clear when we turn to consider Von 
Wright’s paper.  He begins by describing, in comparison to other modal concepts (alethic, 
epistemic, existential) “deontic modes or modes of obligation”.  These are the concepts 
obligatory, permitted and forbidden.  The three concepts are described as “that which we 
                                                 
46 Prior (1954), McLaughlin (1955) Chisholm, (1963)  
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ought to do…that which we are allowed to do…that which we must not do”.  von Wright’s 
first issue is to define those “things” that are “pronounced obligatory, permitted, forbidden”. 
His name for those things is acts (1951, 2). 
   
Leaving aside for the moment the issue of tense, in that he of course refers to future act, and 
not, one would suggest with respect to amnesty, the fact that it deals with past actions, the 
point to stress here is that in contemplating the issue of deontic logic, we are to be concerned 
both with the use of language and its utterances (oral or written) and that we are concerned 
with the actions of individuals.47
 
  
I will now address one specific, yet pivotal, aspect of von Wright’s 1951 paper, a critique of 
it, and his response to that critique which may provide a logical explanation to the grant and 
rescission of amnesty.  In doing so I am following the author in his progression from single to 
multiple acts, singular being the example of obedience to the law given above (1951, 3f). 
 
Promises and Commitment 
 
For the sake of accessibility, I am intentionally avoiding describing the arguments 
symbolically, and hope that by doing so I will not in any way devalue the points I wish to 
make.  A law or truth of Von Wright’s system of deontic logic (or a deontic tautology as he 
describes it) (13) is that doing one act commits us to do another act.  The example Von 
Wright gives is that “giving a promise commits us to keep it” (4).  This sentiment as we saw 
in a previous chapter is the very premise of pacta sunt servanda, and if one accepts my point 
implicit in the principle quod principi placuit, as a legitimate expectation of peoples towards 
their Sovereign, or those exercising sovereign power.  As a result and in light of such it 
provides an, if not the, appropriate part of Von Wright’s system from which to address the 
question of amnesty. 
 
This notion of commitment - by virtue of one act we are, by implication, obliged to undertake 
another act – becomes central to Von Wright’s discussion, and is the first of his six laws on 
“commitment” (13).  In his original position, (the 1951 paper) Von Wright remarked pithily 
                                                 
47 I do not refer to action to the exclusion of intention, however to discuss whether I intend to do that which I 
ought, am allowed or must not do, is an argument that cannot be pursued in this paper. 
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that “Commitment can thus be explained in terms of compatibility” (4)48
 
. Three years later, 
A.N. Prior demonstrated an antinomy in Von Wright’s system when drawing the analogy 
between the paradoxes of strict implication and as he defines it “the paradoxes on derived 
obligation”.  Evidently an obligation is derived where it is the result of two actions the first of 
which commits us to the second.  Prior’s point, put as simply as I can is that the notion of 
commitment may give rise to a paradox if as a result of derived obligation one were to 
undertake an act that was forbidden and that if an act is forbidden, then it is likewise 
forbidden to do that act in conjunction with any other act (64), To paraphrase Von Wright’s 
description of Prior’s point in his response; if an act is forbidden it is obligatory not to do that 
act or to do another arbitrary act (1956, 508) 
Von Wright accepts this criticism and thinks that his previous description “is not an adequate 
expression…of the notion of commitment or (derived obligation)” (italics in original, 509).  
His solution is the introduction in effect of the notion of contingency (509). His description, 
as an explanation of his symbolic terms is “p is permitted under conditions c”, ‘p’ being an act 
and ‘c’ being conditions (which he further remarks may equally be acts). He then introduces 
two further axioms to his original system on the basis of which “one can develop a system of 
“relative” permission, prohibition, and obligation” (509).  Von Wright termed this system, 
new deontic logic.  However he had remarked on in his earlier paper that whilst he dealt with 
deontic propositions as “absolute” it was possible, and I would add may well be practical, to 
make them “relative” (1951, 15).  He argued that they may be relative to a so-called moral 
code.  Put simply “[w]hat is obligatory in one moral code, may be forbidden within another” 
(Ibid).   
 
In his 1956 paper Von Wright nonetheless thought his “absolute” notions survived and were 
included in the new system. This relative system may said to include the old system of 
“absolute” permission, prohibition and obligation by virtue of the fact that the laws, which 
hold in the old system, appear in the new system in the form of laws for permission, 
prohibition, and obligation under tautologous conditions (509).  In the preface to a later essay 
Von Wright (1968) now describes this system as dyadic deontic logic.  Dyadic for Von 
Wright is “conditional, hypothetical, relative” (22) as opposed to his earlier “monadic 
(absolute, categorical, unconditional) deontic logic. In his dyadic system permissibility, as a 
                                                 
48 Now if this is reversed, that which is compatible we are committed to do, is I believe how the paradox to 
which Prior challenges Von Wright to resolve arises 
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deontic possibility of action resembles ability in its sense of the natural possibility of action 
(4). In other words, von Wright sees a relation between that which we are physically able to 
do “subject only to the restrictions which are imposed by the laws of nature” and that which it 
is possible to (or that which we are permitted to do) subject only the restrictions imposed by a 
normative order (58), or if you want to draw the comparative, the law of man. What, in short, 
Von Wright has done is to illustrate the entailment between what he terms natural and deontic 
possibility, which is another means of explaining the suggestion “ought implies can”.49
 
    
It seems prudent, at this point to explain, in more detail, the way in which I contend one can 
apply Von Wright’s dyadic system to the question of amnesty.  In his response to Prior, Von 
Wright was concerned with “paradoxes of derived obligation” in the sense, as contended by 
Prior that because one can draw the analogy between strict implication and Von Wright’s 
description of being committed (having a derived obligation) from one act to another, that this 
could give rise to the paradox where “the doing of what is forbidden commits us to the doing 
of anything whatsoever” (1954, 64).  Now of the part of his law of deontic logic at issue as we 
have seen above was that if an act is forbidden it is obligatory to not undertake that act or 
another arbitrary act, but as Von Wright remarks, because he suggested in his 1951 paper 
“that by doing A commits us (morally) to do B” then a “paradox” instantly arises.  His way 
out of the paradox is his dyadic rather than monadic system.  And that as we have likewise 
seen is one based in contingency, or put another way is conditional.   
 
Now I will consider the question of amnesty through the prism of dyadic deontic logic. If an 
act is forbidden (as a matter of law) this entails (that is to say it is a logical consequence) that 
commits those (with the requisite ability) to hold to account those who have performed that 
act.  Now in an absolute or monadic sense, being so committed (a derived obligation) requires 
those persons who perform the act to be held to account each and every time they perform the 
act.  That would not seem contentious in a normative framework or law (as Von Wright 
describes his deontic “life-tree”, the topological pictorial representation of the possibilities of 
action (1968, pp 51, 64)).  However what the practice of amnesty, and for that matter its 
rescission requires is that neither the entailment nor the logical consequences that ordinarily 
follow do so.  This is where the dyadic system takes effect, for it allows one to no longer be 
committed to hold those to account when certain conditions pertain.  The conclusion von 
                                                 
49 See also Rescher (1967, 133f) 
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Wright reaches is that it does not follow that “an ‘absolutely’ forbidden act commits us to any 
other act nor that any act commits us to an ‘absolutely’ obligatory act…[t]hus what Prior 
called The Paradoxes of Derived Obligation to not arise in this system” (1956, 509).  If that is 
so it makes it possible under certain conditions to no longer be subject to an absolute 
obligation derived from a law50
 
.  It offers in other words a contingent exception, not dissimilar 
I would posit from the conclusion of Brandt’s interpretation of Kant lex permissiva in Chapter 
2.  Again I am only concerned, at this stage, with the possibility of their being certain 
conditions not to be obligated, not what those conditions might be.  
Duty and Conditional Permission 
 
The third chapter of Von Wright’s 1968 work is an extended version of a paper he presented 
at the University of Pittsburgh in 1966 and is reproduced in part from Rescher (1967).  The 
title of the presentation in Pittsburgh was The Logic of Action – A Sketch during which Von 
Wright provided two definitions of deontic logic “The logical study of the permissibility of 
actions…from the point of view of a normative order is…called deontic logic” (Rescher 134 
and “Deontic logic is the logical study of action from the point of view of their permissibility” 
(Rescher, 135). This latter description is compared to proheairetic logic, “the logical study of 
acts from the point of view of their preferability…the core of a general logic of value 
concepts.” (Ibid.)  When considered with the distinction which Von Wright makes as 
important at the beginning of his extended 1968 essay, that “between deontological or 
normative concepts on the one hand and axiological or value concepts on the other” (12), (the 
latter being good and bad, useful and pleasant, to give but two of his comparative examples) 
one can note similarities between Von Wright’s comparison of deontological to axiological51
 
 
(or right to value) and Kymlicka’s Rawlsian comparative of deontological to teleological, 
which I have already argued is instructive in terms of the question of amnesty.   
Now that von Wright indicates that his absolute (monadic) system is included in his new 
(dyadic) system is indicative of the fact that notwithstanding the conditional nature, of 
exceptions from rule, it follows that the absolute system will still sustain despite departures 
from it.   
                                                 
50 This argument could equally be sound in terms of moral obligation.  It means that the ’norm’, that those who 
commit crime ought to be punished, can be excepted from whilst maintaining the validity of that norm. 
51 Furthermore Von Wright remarks that “[t]he important notion of preference is also axiological” (Ibid).  
Whether amnesty is preferable is again a matter to be discussed in the next chapter. 
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If one also considers Roderick Chisholm’s paper on contrary-to-duty imperative and Von 
Wright’s comments to that view, we may consistently develop the argument I am advancing 
in understanding the notion and practice of amnesty and its rescission.  Chisholm explains that 
contrary-to-duty imperatives are “imperatives telling us what we ought to do if we neglect 
certain of our duties” (1963, 33). Von Wright gives what in effect is the rationale or norm 
underlying punitive law, “[a] man who has…done the forbidden, usually thereby becomes 
committed to undergoing some penalty” in order to right the wrong, and having given 
examples of apology and compensation states, in reference to Chisholm’s paper, that he “has 
drawn attention to this type [and] has coined for it the name Contrary-to-Duty Imperative” 
(1968, 74).  Now whilst von Wright remarks that from a moral or legal point of view these 
remarks might not be of great interest (a point I would concur given their arguable, if not 
demonstrable, self evidence) he does see a problem from the point of view of logic.  His 
concern is, to paraphrase, I hope correctly, how to express, logically, the change in norms, or 
normative codes or laws, or to retrieve (he uses the word “hook”, but I am confident that his 
and my interpretation are sufficiently similar) the normative code extant prior to the forbidden 
act.  In the case I am concerned with between law and penalty, and amnesty and absence of 
penalty (or for that matter rescission and subsequent penalty), this question is pivotal to the 
validity of each grant and rescission. The answer he considers is that retrieval “should be 
effected by means of the notion of conditional permission, obligation, and prohibition” (Ibid, 
75), in short by his dyadic system of deontic logic, which we can therefore apply to amnesty.   
 
There is however another exchange between Chisholm’s and von Wright’s respective papers 
in the preceding paragraph which is perhaps even more pertinent, in terms of the examples 
used by the authors, to the notion of amnesty.  In comments to von Wright (Rescher 1967) 
Chisholm takes the view that von Wright seems to view deontic logic psychologistically that 
is to say that if you say an action is permitted that implies it is “permitted by someone or 
other, or by laws, or by the state” (Ibid, 138).  Now this for Chisholm presents a further 
difficulty as if as he says Von Wright contends deontic logic is concerned with man-made 
law, “we have no guarantee that the law will not be such as to forbid p and also to forbid not-
p” (Ibid), p being the action permitted above.  Von Wright’s response, given in recognition 
that he agrees to the criticisms, is that he does “not want to view deontic (and prohairetic) 
logic exclusively in what Chisholm calls the ‘psychologistic’ way…[b]ut I would wish to 
include this view too in my conception of deontic (and prohairetic) logic.”  He thus allows 
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latitude, or relativity, to enter his system once more, and concedes that whilst von Wright 
claims that the principles of deontic logic (for which I read his dyadic system, given this paper 
is presented a decade after his paper establishing the basis for that system) are valid for man-
made law, he remarks a lawgiver who “prohibits both of two contradictory modes of action to 
one and the same subject on one and the same occasion, contradicts himself…and what the 
self-contradicting lawgiver issues are not (“real”) prohibitions” (Ibid,  144f). 
 
What von Wright’s system does allow for, noting that penalty usually follows the commission 
of a forbidden act and that real prohibitions (or obligations or permissions), is that it can 
follow where the lawgiver prohibits (or permits or obliges) two contradictory modes of action 
not to one and the same subject or not on one and the same occasions.  If I am right in that 
contention, amnesty is possible in terms of dyadic deontic logic, and likewise amnesty’s 
rescission. 
 
Kelsen’s accordancy 
 
Contemporaneously to von Wright and Chisholm, in 1965, at 84 years old, Hans Kelsen wrote 
an essay entitled Law and Logic propounding the widely held view “that it is a specific 
property of law to be “logical”; which is to say, that in their mutual relations the norms of law 
correspond with the principles of logic” (1973, 228). As a demonstration of this argument, 
Kelsen describes a “relation of accordancy” and uses the example of the death penalty for 
murder (247). Kelsen considers there being a logical relation between the “state-of-affairs 
established in concreto” by a court “under the state-of-affairs defined in abstracto in the 
general norm” (246). The Latin terms simply refer to the investigation and determination by 
the judge of the elements of the offence which legislation defines.  He sees accordance 
between the punishment for murder being hanging (the abstract case), and that that is the 
decision which the judge reaches having established the “concrete case”, or put another way, 
the facts.  Now as the judge sentences the offender to death by hanging, this “individual norm 
accords with the general norm” (247).  However Kelsen’s contention is that does not mean 
that the “validity of the individual norm follows logically from that of the general one” (Ibid) 
because if I take Kelsen’s comments correctly, it only presupposes (or as he puts it creates the 
presupposition) for the judge to apply (or posit) the individual norm, and that application is a 
matter of the judge’s will (Ibid). 
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Such sentiments no doubt reflect Kelsen’s contention that norms are the result of an act of 
will. They are always in that sense prescriptive, not descriptive. And Kelsen is categorical in 
both that you cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ nor can an ‘is’ be inferred from an 
‘ought’52
 
.  
For the purposes of this study however, Kelsen’s short addition to this essay written two years 
later and entitled Law and Logic Again, (1973, 254ff) written two years later, resonates even 
more strongly for the remarks he offers to a paper by Karel Engliš53
 
. Kelsen here concurs with 
much of Engliš’ remarks, which clearly maintain the view that norms do not, and cannot, 
unlike judgments have truth-values. Furthermore whilst judgments may have among them 
logical contradictions, norms may not.  However in Engliš’ rationale for this Kelsen differs. “ 
[t]he reason [Engliš] gives, why there can be no logical contradiction between norms is that 
“The norm cannot be negated”. But this reason is not sound” Kelsen indded considers “‘To 
negate the norm’ can mean to negate the validity of a norm. That is the statement that a norm 
prescribing some sort of conduct is not valid. Such a statement is possible and can be true or 
false.” (255) Thus is may permit of contradiction, and in this sense the negation of only the 
validity but not of the norm makes exception permissible. 
It should however be made clear here that Kelsen explains his position that “the validity of a 
norm is the meaning of an act of will” and that following the second edition of his Reine 
Rechtslehre (Pure Theory of Law) which he references, he regards “the norm, not as “an act 
of will” but as the meaning of such an act” (1973, 256).  In this sense one may think that the 
norm is concerned with what is meant by the act, it being willed into existence, and its 
validity, the intention behind it, the outcome (or end) intended to result following its 
promulgation.  On the question of its validity, Kelsen, concurring again with Engliš maintains 
the view that there can be no logical contradiction between norms, as “a contradiction can 
                                                 
52 Cf. On the Concept of  Norm (Kelsen, 1973, 216).  This essay similarly written in 1965 Kelsen remarks forms 
the first chapter of his larger work “The General Theory of Norms” (Allgemeine Theorie der Normen 1979 trans. 
1991).  In the concluding paragraph Kelsen cautions against drawing the synonymy between must and ought, for 
the former expresses causal, the latter, normative, necessity.  Now in light of his essay I would read causal as 
must follow (that is that it has to) and normative in that it ought to (or that it should), or at the risk of the former 
statement being a tautology, that it will follow, or that it may follow.  One might be tempted to suggest such 
indicative of the distinction in von Wright’s monadic and dyadic system, although this may be thought too much 
of a leap of faith, but Kelsen’s view would seem to imply a latitude in terms of ought-sentences not present in 
must-sentences. 
53 Die Norm ist kein Urteil (The Norm is not a Judgment).  This title is intriguing again if one thinks of von 
Wright comparative of deontological or normative to axiological or value concepts, the latter, including as von 
Wright remarked (1968, 12),  preference, are judgments, not norms. 
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subsist only between propositions that are true and false, whereas norms are neither” (Ibid, 
255) There can though be logical contradictions between judgments.  However when Kelsen 
provides the example with which I am most concerned he departs, albeit slightly from his 
concurrence with Engliš.  A “norm-positing subject”, for Engliš, may, by another act of will, 
“put his norm out of action, recall, abolish or change it” (Ibid) and may do so of their own 
volition or by someone authorised by the subject for that purpose.  This of course seems 
indicative of the very nature and practice of legislative reform, an example of which is the 
grant and rescission of amnesty.  However Kelsen takes the view that such total or partial 
abolition is only possible by virtue of a specific norm “a derogating54
     
 norm” (Ibid) 
specifically created (one assumes by an act of will) for that purpose.  “This case” Kelsen 
remarks “must be distinguished from that in which the validity of a norm prescribing some 
sort of conduct is met by that of another prescribing the opposite; as in “Whoever commits 
murder is to punished with death” and “Nobody is to be punished with death”. There is a 
conflict of norms, which is not a logical contradiction” (Ibid). 
The question which this then poses is whether amnesty, in response to an extant punitive law, 
or rescission in response to an amnesty, conflict, in that they appear the negative of the other. 
If one thinks as Kelsen contends not of the negation of norms, but rather of the validity of 
norms. This would thus negate only its validity, which may be re-established, not the norm 
per se. For negation for in the circumstances I am concerned with regarding atrocity law, the 
law, the amnesty and the rescission are all arguably if not demonstrably acts of will.   
 
Interestingly Kelsen, concludes his article with reference to a paper in which Ota Weinberger 
in 1958, refers conceivably to an application of logical principles (as we have seen above with 
regard to those relations such as contradiction and entailment obtaining between norms, 
notwithstanding their lack of truth-value) “under the proviso that logic can be extended by the 
addition of a special logic of ought-statements (Ibid, 256).  That special logic is deontic logic.  
 
Peter Geach, in his paper Imperatives and Deontic Logic provides as an illustration of his 
argumentation the example of a king’s pardon for a traitor’s act.  This I would suggest, and at 
least as far as I can discern, is the closest example to the question of amnesty evident in the 
works on deontic logic I have considered.  Geach proposes three answers the question “Ought 
                                                 
54 I will return to derogation more substantively in the next chapter. 
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I to do P?”  It is your duty to do P; it is all right for you to do P, and also it is alright for you 
not to do P; and it is your duty not to do P. (1958, 49) He describes the second as the 
conjunction of the negations of the first and last, yet explains that such an suggestion, like 
others requires the foundation (“backing”) of a general moral principle.  Geach suggests “they 
need to be backed up by general permissive principles, of the form “For anybody satisfying 
the conditions C, it is alright to do P (or: not to do P).” (50). That suggestion is of course 
precisely the description given by von Wright (1956, 309) in defining his relative or 
conditional, dyadic deontic logic.  Now Geach’s example of “moral reasoning from general 
permissive principles” is of a counsellor’s indicating to the king his option; to pardon or 
punish, and the “counsellor is appealing to general permissive principles that he accepts.” 
(Ibid).  Those general permissive principles, I argue, equally pertain to the question of 
amnesty which, if not synonymous, is related to the concept of pardon55
 
. 
Kelsen critiques Geach in suggesting that what Geach is referring to “is not a case of 
permitting but of empowering”, and claims the lack of distinguishing between the two is 
indicative of a number of writings on deontic logic (1991, 101 n7). The distinction Kelsen is 
arguably seeking to draw is between the capacity to decide and the decision itself.  To permit 
is the decision made, empowering is being in the position of being able to permit, or in 
Kelsen’s words “conferring on an individual the power to posit and apply norms” (Ibid, 
102)56
 
.   
The technical Ought 
 
To summarise the position thus far:  We have reached a stage where logic allows, in certain 
conditional or contingent circumstances to depart from absolute norms (Prior). We can 
logically do so whilst not affecting the continuity of the norm or law (Chisholm). Finally, we 
can do so with the backing of general permissive principles (Geach). 
 
I shall now turn to what I see as von Wright’s conclusion, reaffirming each of these three 
points. 
 
                                                 
55 See also Wellman (May, 2008, 249, n1) 
56 The notion of empowerment is intrinsically linked both to my discussion of the basis of obligation in Chapter 
1 and to the question of the recognition of a ‘norm-creating authority’ to use Kelsen’s phrase in the next chapter.  
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As we saw earlier, in 1951 in drawing the distinction from other modal concepts, Von Wright 
remarked “[t]here are the deontic modes or modes of obligation. These are concepts such as 
the obligatory (that which we ought to do), the permitted (that which we are allowed to do), 
and the forbidden (that which we must not do).” (1) 
 
In summarising his position on the Is-Ought debate, over thirty years later, von Wright 
wrote57 “Norms pronounce certain things (actions or states) to be obligatory, permitted or 
forbidden.” (199858
 
, 379).  These pronouncements are prescriptions, not descriptions of those 
deontic modes.  It is however in the content, and by referring to such I presume von Wright 
means, not in the concept, that the significance lies. The content being “that which norms 
pronounce obligatory, permitted or forbidden” (Ibid) and which are intended to describe the 
ideal to which we should direct our endeavours.  It is in the content that relations can exist and 
the study of those relations is for von Wright the subject matter of deontic logic (Ibid).  
Von Wright’s view is that in consideration of action in respect of norms, the concern is 
principally the satisfaction of the norm.  This leads to the conclusion both that “unless such-
and-such is done the norm will not be satisfied…therefore if the norm is to be satisfied such-
and-such ought to be done”. (Ibid)  This ought is not the ought that the norm prescribes, e.g. 
you should not kill, the “normative Ought”, rather in von Wright’s terminology, it is a 
“technical Ought”.  This he describes “expresses a requirement, a practical necessity, and it is 
often – and perhaps better – rendered by the word must” (Ibid, 377). This proposition he 
explains by the example of promise and commitment.  Such, as we have seen, was the 
example by which he responded in 1956 to Prior and that which formed the basis arguably of 
his dyadic system.  In defining a technical Ought, which von Wright see as “equally 
common” yet clearly different from “the deontic or normative ought of moral or legal norms” 
he suggests its ‘technical’ sense can be understood by the example “If I have given a promise, 
I ought (must, have to) fulfil it in order to satisfy the obligation constituted by the norm which 
prohibits breach of the promise given.”(Ibid).  The norm is that you ought to keep your 
promises.  The technical ought is that you must keep your promises, or else the norm will no 
longer be satisfied and arguable thereafter no longer a norm.  
 
                                                 
57 Immediately preceding this summary, von Wright engages with the two seminal papers referred to at note 2 
and what follows are his comments to Searle and Black. See (1998, 376ff) 
58 von Wright’s essay Is and Ought, which I have taken from Paulson (1998) was first published in Man, Law 
and Modern Forms of Life Bulygin, E. et al (eds) in 1985.   
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As the technical Ought is for von Wright a fact and in that sense is an ‘is’ as it is a statement 
(or might one say description) of a fact “which is internal to the assumed existence of a 
‘normative’ Ought…nothing normative follows from [the technical Ought], although 
something normative may be presupposed in it.” (379). And if a technical Ought is a practical 
necessity, this may offer one conclusion as to the practice, if not the concept of amnesty and 
its rescission. 
 
Now earlier in his paper von Wright discussed the practice of legislation and remarked that 
such is illustrative of circumstances in which “a technical Ought can be said to ‘back’ or to 
justify a deontic Ought.” (378)59
 
 We have of course seen this notion of “backing” already in 
Geach’s paper above. And it is to Geach’s notion of general principles accepted by those 
party (or subject) to the system that von Wright refers. 
Von Wright then turns to what, from the point of view of the principal concern of this paper is 
arguably the pivotal issue. 
 
“The question might be raised: Is it theoretically conceivable that all laws of the state could be 
given a backing [or justification] in technical norms?” (379). I consider that here he is 
referring in an equally synonymous fashion to technical oughts for he continues “[s]o that 
every ought of a legal norm could be, as it were, translated into the Ought of a technical norm 
which is to say that unless certain things are the case (citizens and officials observe certain 
conduct60
 
) the law-givers’ aims will be forfeited?” (379). The word unless, italicized in the 
original, is again indicative of his notion of negation that we saw at the beginning of the 
chapter. 
He continues, “[t]o the best of my knowledge no law code is written in the form of technical 
norms” and von Wright explains that this would not enable an ought to be reducible from an 
is (or rather the ‘is’ of a technical ought) “[f]or the law-code would not be ‘meant’ to be a 
description of what is required if certain aims are to be attained; it would be ‘meant’ to urge 
                                                 
59 It should be noted that as far as I can discern his use of the term normative Ought and deontic Ought are 
synonymous.  That which is deontic is normative.  He also however uses the remark “technical norms”, which he 
explained earlier in his paper as “closely related to that which Kant called a ‘hypothetical imperative’ (1998, 
377) 
60 Cf. D Dachies Raphael’s remarks on what be termed the capacity to compel (1954, 348).  It is worth noting as 
an aside that in this article the author refers to Pacta sunt servanda as a normative principle in Social Contract 
theory (as opposed, or perhaps in addition ,to the context I referred to it in the first chapter). 
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‘all those concerned’ to live up to the ideal. Its ‘meaning’ qua law would be prescriptive not 
descriptive.”(379). This last sentence is perhaps of even greater interest if one asks whether it 
is reflective of Kelsen’s what the “meaning” of a norm is. Given its significance it is worth 
quoting the passage from General Theory in full:  
 
 “III. The Norm as the Meaning of an Act of Will 
 When it refers to a prescription or command, the word ‘norm’ means that something is 
to be or is to happen.  Its linguistic expression is an imperative or a sollen [ought]-sentence. 
The act whose meaning is that something is commanded or prescribed is an act of will.  That 
which is commanded or prescribed is primarily particular human behaviour.  When someone 
commands or prescribes, he wills that something ought to happen.  The Ought-the norm-is the 
meaning of a willing or act of will, and-if the norm is a prescription or command-it is the 
meaning of an act directed to the behaviour of another person, an act whose meaning is that 
another person (or persons) is to behave in a certain way” (1991, 2)61
 
 
A technical ought, when thought of in relation to a norm (legal or moral) thus provides for the 
deontic possibility of departing from that norm, in certain or conditional circumstances, in 
other words is a contingent exception.  
 
The question one should then ask is whether the grant and rescission of amnesty are thought 
of as technical or normative (or deontic) oughts and if the former, do they in some way ‘back’ 
or ‘justify’ the latter. 
 
In considering an amnesty one must first assume the existence of a law, against which the 
amnesty is offered to be a fact.  To apply von Wright’s approach; that the law exists must be 
presupposed (as a norm) in contemplating whether one ought to grant an amnesty. 
 
Secondly, in considering rescinding an amnesty, similarly one assumes that an amnesty has 
been granted as a fact, therefore it must be presupposed in contemplating its rescission.  Thus 
                                                 
61 It may be recalled from note 5 above that the essay On the Concept of the Norm was to form the first chapter 
of General Theory of Norms.  There is however a difference in the passage just quoted and the one to be found in 
the earlier essay (1973, 217). It remarks that rather than the Ought, “Obligation, the norm, is the meaning of an 
act of will”. If this is not an error of translation, it would indicate that Kelsen maintains the position that that 
which we ought to do is obligatory.  Thus if there ought to be for example amnesty granted or rescinded then it 
follows that there is an obligation to make it so. And if amnesty is thought of as a deontic utterance (an ought 
sentence) in for example von Wright’s dyadic system, then does it again follows that it ought to be and thus we 
are under an obligation grant or rescind? 
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in both circumstances, given that presupposition and as a technical ought amnesty (and 
rescission) are logically permissible. 
 
Having reached the conclusion that it is logically possible we need then to ask whether 
amnesty or its rescission is right, and thus something it is necessary that we must do. 
 
The Right to Amnesty or Is Amnesty the Right thing to do? 
 
In the same journal as the final work of Von Wright that I have considered62, two authors 
from Jagellonian University in Kraków, draw a stark analogy between deontic logic and law.  
Opałek and Woleński state that “[t]he concept of permission analysed in deontic logic and/or 
the logic of norms, corresponds roughly speaking to the concept of right investigated by the 
study of law.”63
 
 And that given that particularly legal theory and jurisprudence look at 
difficulties concerning the concept of right, “jurists consider the concept of right, like 
logicians that of permission, in the context of duty (or obligation)” (1991, 335).  
I return then to the questions I posed at the outset of this chapter, ought we to grant or rescind 
amnesty, that is to say is it obligatory that we do so? Or to suggest a final variation, is there a 
right to amnesty (or its rescission) and is that action the right thing to do? 
 
Taking von Wright’s position and the comparative Opałek and Woleński draw above suggests 
an answer to those questions.  Going back to Von Wright (1951)64
                                                 
62 In 1991 von Wright posed the question Is There a Logic of Norms? And in an essay of the same title sought to 
answer in the affirmative.  His remarks, “One could well have a meta-norm to the effect that the not-prohibited is 
permitted. The well-known principles Nulla poena sine lege and Nullum crimen sine lege may be thought of as 
versions of this meta-norm” will be considered in more detail, I consider more appropriately in the next chapter.  
It may be worth noting that in Is and Ought von Wright thought the term logic of norms, misleading (1998, 379) 
 and substituting amnesty 
for p we can suggest amnesty is obligatory if, and only if, not-amnesty is not permitted.  This 
is of course the logical explanation of the position that whilst there is a punitive law there can 
be no amnesty.  We have however seen that there is the possibility of certain circumstances of 
excepting from norms (or laws), of being permitted to do so, and one might argue that this is 
in circumstances where it is the right thing to do.  To then apply the comparative, amnesty is 
obligatory if, and only if, not amnesty is not right.  Thus it logically follows that if amnesty is 
63 The authors remark that they omit intentionally the problem of permission in ethics 
64 See above 
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, it is obligatory.  In that sense I believe we can resolve the antinomy between the 
deontological and teleological view referred to at the start of this chapter.  The same argument 
works equally when we consider that rescission is right. 
In concluding his essay von Wright (1998) seeks to defend a positivist position in terms of the 
philosophy of legal and moral norms.  He argues that “[t]he law of the state says that we 
ought this and that”, but asks “ought we, without exception to obey the law” (380). Those, for 
von Wright who say they ought not to obey the law, claim “to have a right to dissent”.  And 
he asks if when asserting such a right, it is true that the claimant could say he “is free, is 
permitted has a right to disobey” (Ibid).  The foundation however for von Wright of such a 
claim is not truth, but what he calls assent.  Most of our actions to conform with the law are 
done “just because it is the law”.  There may however be reasons of expediency for doing so, 
but von Wright concludes “[s]ometimes, finally, one obeys thinking it is right to do so – 
either because on considers the thing is right as such, or because one considers it right to obey 
the law of the state as such.  Then one assents to the legal Ought.” (380f). This of course 
suggests that one is at liberty to assent or dissent, if not at will, then certainly with some 
degree of latitude or freedom.  Von Wright further remarks “By assenting to the norm given 
to him by some external norm giving authority, the agent gives the same law to himself so to 
speak – transforms it from heteronymous to autonomous.  In this same sense of ‘assent’ a 
subject may also create norms for his own conduct.  Assenting, one could also say, is 
prescriptive and not descriptive (mental) activity.” (381)  Therefore if assenting is 
prescriptive, and, as we have seen that which we ought to do is equally a prescription, one 
may conclude that if we assent to prescription we consent ourselves to be bound.  We see that 
which we ought to do as obligatory.  Hence, if we believe we ought to grant or rescind 
amnesties when certain conditions are present, then there is an obligation to do so.  However 
in the context of atrocity law, the existence of such conditions and thus those obligations that 
they permit has to be reconciled against questions both a precedent and of derogation.  I will 
now turn to the question of that reconciliation. 
                                                 
65 The term right however raises the question of the distinction between amnesty however being as a matter of 
right or the right thing to do. One might again think of this rather than a legal but more as a question of moral 
permissibility. See Wellman (May, 2008)   
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5. 
 
AMNESTY, PRECEDENT AND DEROGATION 
 
For any normative order to subsist, the notion of precedent must, I suggest, have to central 
role to play in that subsistence. The very notion of normativity is that there is a norm that 
ought to be followed, and in that sense is arguably of a precendential nature. Precedent in its 
general sense is, arguably, the idea that there is a form of obligation to follow the decisions or 
actions of others in previous, yet like situations, to the circumstances we face. In legal and 
especially judicial terms this is a means of ensuring consistency which in turn support 
validity, and the efficacy of laws, and for that matter the legal system. One might suggest that 
an idea of precedent may be thought to reflect in positive law what Hume spoke of in terms of 
laws of nature, that of constant conjunction. If there is constant conjunction then it is 
reasonable to assume the ‘truth’ or validity of that law. This amounts to the argument that 
certainty and predictability of actions and decisions is necessary for continuity of the 
adherence to the rules given in and by a system and thus its legitimacy or validity.    
 
This chapter will seek to address the question of precedent and remark on the relationship of 
precedent to amnesty through two aspects; stare decisis and rules of derogation. In response 
to those who may contend that amnesties are incompatible with international law because they 
conflict with non-derogable rights, I will contend that following the three previous chapters, 
there are circumstances in which amnesties are permissible derogations.   
 
In essay considering the premises of the notion of precedent, Postema considers Hobbes’ 
remark in the Leviathan that law is not counsel but command as indicating that law “is an 
authoritative, peremptory directive to action.  As authoritative, the fact of the law’s having 
been declared or established is thought to be reason enough to follow it. As peremptory, it is 
intended to preclude independent deliberation regarding the merits of the actions in question 
by those who fall under the rule” (1987, 13). Why we should follow precedent or as Postema 
terms it “the past decision as a peremptory rule” (Ibid, 15) is for that very necessity of 
certainty and predictability. If we want a rule to sustain it makes good sense, or there is good 
reason, to follow that past decision as peremptory, and thus as precedent. If we choose 
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consistently to not follow a precedent it loses its normative status, for if no longer efficacious 
as a rule of action, the law loses its validity. 
 
If the question of following precedent is one of the peremptory nature of a rule, the 
acknowledgement of it as authoritative is the premise of its validity. By virtue of what H L A 
Hart termed a “rule of recognition”, the acknowledgment of the rule as authoritative, provides 
it with, if you will, the force of law because it provides “the proper way of disposing of 
doubts as to the existence of the rule” (1997, 95).  The rule of recognition is for Hart the very 
basis of legal order, rather than a “general habit of obedience to a legally unlimited sovereign” 
(Ibid 292). However as I sought to demonstrate in the first chapter, the notion of the “legally 
unlimited sovereign” is, if one considers those maxims that predicate much of modern law, 
arguably fallacious. If as Hart remarks the rule of recognition provides “authoritative criteria 
for the identification of the valid rules of the system” (Ibid), we can relate the notion of 
recognition or acknowledgement of authoritative status with the consensual concept of 
obligation for we consent ourselves to be bound as we recognise the legitimacy of the 
authority in whom we vest the capacity to make those decisions. As Cross summarises “[t]he 
rule of recognition does not owe its validity to another rule, but the fact that it is accepted and 
acted upon by the appropriate officials” (1977, 213). The appropriateness of the officials be 
they legislators or judges, the latter appointed in system for which the legislators provide, is 
determined, both as a result of the expression of will of the populace as discussed in Chapter 
1. 
 
Having discussed an arguable basis for precedent, based on recognition and acknowledgement 
of the authority which has made the decision which is the precedent to follow, I shall now 
turn to ask in what circumstances it is possible, permissible or necessary to not follow 
precedents. 
 
Stare Decisis 
 
Postema’s essay reviews three concepts which he describes may be seen of as Some Roots of 
our Notion of Precedent. The title itself indicates that his does not consider his list exhaustive, 
but the three approaches, (classical) positivist, traditionalist (or classical common law theory) 
and conventionalist are in his view indicative of, if not pervasive upon, contemporary notions 
of precedent and indicating their roots raises pertinent questions of contemporary use of 
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precedent in practice (1987 13/33). Indicative of the positivist concept, evident, as Postema 
sees Bentham influence was the notion of “binding precedent” or stare decisis (33)   
 
Stare decisis is described by another author, Cross, thus; “[the] general orthodox 
interpretation of stare decisis [is as] stare rationibus decidendis (‘keep to the rationes 
decidendi of past cases’)” (1977, 105). This description indicates that there may be variations 
to this interpretation, and likewise he indicates that the notion of ratio decidendi has varying 
interpretations (Ibid). Nonetheless with these caveats that the rule of stare decisis may not be 
universally interpreted or applied, it is the principle that informs the practice of precedent, in 
the sense that it creates an obligation that courts can be, and are, bound to follow a previous 
decision. Such obligation of course depends on the respective relationship of the court 
deciding and the court that has decided. Two comments from Cross perhaps best allude to the 
application of these principles to practice. First to say a judge or a court is so bound he 
suggests, “the judge is under an obligation to apply a particular ratio decidendi to the facts 
before him in the absence of a reasonable legal distinction between those facts and the facts to 
which it was applied in the previous case” and second, that “[i]t is recognised by past and 
present holders of the judicial office who use it as a justification for their conduct” (104)66
 
.  
The obligation to follow the decision of others arises then from the recognition of those 
previous deciders holding the office from which the justification and legitimacy of that 
decision derives. This arguably institutional theory is both endemic and essential to any legal 
system in order to maintain consistency and through consistency maintain legitimacy.  As 
Postema describes from the point of view of the “conventionalist” conception of law, a 
marriage of positivist and traditionary concepts, that “[t]he most important property we 
demand of law…is that they be certain and settled” (25), or in the Humean terms, that 
Postema quotes, “steady and constant” (27). In conclusion as we have seen Postema notes that 
each of these conceptions is not without difficulties, but nonetheless the notion of stare 
decisis prevails and it is to the question of ‘binding precedent’ that I must turn my attention in 
respect of the question of amnesty. 
Amnesty as I remarked in the introduction may seem the very anathema to precedent. If one 
considers precedent beyond the sense of stare decisis and the practice of courts the very 
notion is essential to the continuity of adherence to the law, because if you did not expect or 
                                                 
66 Of course such recognition as we have already seen in Cross’ comment on Hart’s rule is the very source of the 
Rule of Recognition’s validity (1977, 213) cited above. 
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anticipate the law to apply, you may not be inclined to adhere to it. The notion of precedent 
therefore perpetuates the expectation that law will apply and that your obligations to adhere to 
it need constantly to be met. Expectation of application, enforced by the notion of precedent, 
is integral to the efficacy of law. 
 
Now the question of the viability of amnesty can arguably turn on the rigidity of the 
application of the notion of precedent or stare decisis.  
 
Given the exploratory nature of this paper I will only turn initially to just one jurisdiction to 
look for a possible answer to the question of rigid and flexible application of precedent. I take 
the view however that the principles espoused can have application beyond that singular 
realm.   
 
What might be termed a deontological approach was espoused by the highest court of the 
realm of the United Kingdom, the House of Lords in what is known as the 1966 Practice 
Statement. This statement, made by the House independent of any proceedings by the Lord 
Chancellor of the time, Lord Gardiner on 26th July 1966 read  
  
“Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon 
which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides a 
least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their 
affairs, as well as the basis for orderly development of legal rules” 
 
So far so good for those adhering to the conventionalist concept, however the statement 
continued, 
 
“Their Lordships nevertheless recognize that too rigid adherence to precedent may 
lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of 
the law. They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating 
former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from previous decisions 
when it appears right to do so.” 
 
There is no qualification to what determines the appearance, nor the rightness of when 
departure can or should occur. Yet the House did not finish there. To conclude they remarked, 
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“In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the 
basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been 
entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law. This 
announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this 
House” (cited in Cross, 1977, 109) 
 
Thus the House sought to preserve the norm of precedent that underlies the certainty that law, 
in order to maintain both validity and efficacy requires but for them, and them alone, hence 
the “elsewhere”, precedent can be subject to a contingent exception. 
 
In response to technical contentions as to the validity of the Statement Cross remarks “can 
there be any doubt that it owes its validity to the inherent power of any court to regulate its 
own practice?”(110). However perhaps the House itself offers the best reflection on its own 
statement when, six years after the Statement, Lord Reid explained that given there were a 
number of decisions “which were generally thought to be impeding the proper development of 
the law” and where the “old view” of basically binding precedent be adhered to this would 
give rise to greater uncertainty than if these decisions were overruled (112).  This of course 
indicates that as a matter of practice, where previous decisions might be thought to impede the 
law’s proper development, they may be excepted from; you need not follow precedent.  Lord 
Reid cautioned that such an exercise must be “used sparingly”, one might say, judiciously, but 
it nonetheless, in the context of a court regulation of its own practice, permits exception from 
the general rule of precedent, or stare decisis. 
 
In a subsequent paper on the theories of adjudication for judges trained in the English 
common law tradition, Wesley-Smith describes for the purposes of his argument stare decisis 
as “the doctrine of binding or authoritative precedent, according to which judicial decisions 
must be followed in appropriate subsequent cases” (1987, 73 n1)67
                                                 
67 Whilst subsequent to Cross, Wesley-Smith’s paper is taken from the same volume as Postema’s 
. Wesley-Smith’s 
contention and conclusion is that those theories of adjudication are incompatible with an 
absolute binding effect. Precedent, on his view, is not law. That is to say, for the statement 
may be perceived as misleading, the obligation to follow precedent may be superseded by the 
obligation to follow law. In Wesley-Smith’s words “judges owe their fidelity, not to the 
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pronouncements of predecessors, but to the law…they are ultimately free to reject precedent 
if they do not believe it represents the law.” (87)   
 
In order to appreciate how he reaches this conclusions we need to look to the two theories 
with which Wesley-Smith concerns himself; declaratory and positivist. A declaratory theory 
of the decisions judges (adjudication) is that they only declare what the law is. A positivist 
theory is that judges by their decision have the capacity to make law.  
 
If one thinks of this as an example of a precedent that permits an exception then one might 
suppose or propose that such is the same as a norm that permits derogation to perhaps 
following Wesley-Smith that when departing from precedent the rationale is “not that such... 
was bad law but that it was not law” (78). It is equally feasible that being fallible judges (and 
equally legislators) might make mistakes as to the law in that same way that all make 
mistakes as to fact. And in that sense the precedent might not be said to accord with the law, 
for the accordance was erroneously determined.   
 
Wesley-Smith gives as an indication of what he terms “the practical requirement for 
certainty” a quote from Bentham, which is, there can be little doubt influential on, if not a 
source for, Hart’s rule of recognition described above; “The deference that is due to the 
determination of former judgments is not due to their wisdom, but to their authority” (84 n53). 
And when faced with the question as to why precedents or those decisions that are precedents 
are applied to successive decisions Bentham extols it is “[n]ot because it ought to have been 
established but because it is established” (Ibid). This very remark on establishment indicates 
that at some point the decision must have come into being, was not immutable and if not 
immutable, then it must be, by definition variable and thus capable of contingent exception.   
 
Wesley-Smith subsequently remarks that “if...judges turned to the notion of accepting that 
they are capable of making law, at best they could accept on vertical stare decisis, not the 
horizontal variety” (85). This conception, limited to vertical, that is to say hierarchical system, 
enables us to explain the fact that, as established under principles of international law, such as 
pacta sunt servanda and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, international 
tribunals are not so vertically bound.  There is not such relationship between them, and in 
light of such the contention that amnesties granted are incompatible with international law, 
must fail, at least on the basis of arguments predicated on precedent.  
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To summarise, the determination must be one where judge is declaring the law and is thus 
obligated to apply the law. In the words of a Australian judge, in 1913, prior to his 
appointment as Chief Justice of Australia describing the declaratory theory of adjudication 
stated “A prior decision does not constitute the law, but is only a judicial declaration as to 
what the law is” (quoted in Wesley-Smith, 1987, 76).  Or to adopt the second approach, that 
the judge is able to adopt and adapt precedent so as to make law.  In each circumstance the 
concept of binding precedent, in Wesley-Smith’s view, which I find highly convincing, is 
incompatible with theories of adjudication.  That incompatibility, perhaps some might suggest 
paradoxically, but nonetheless rationally, thus makes, at least in the terms described above, 
amnesties compatible with international law. I will return to the issue of compatibility in the 
conclusion.  
 
Cross, we can recall, considered the expansion of the legal Latin maxim to properly reflect the 
role of reason in adherence to previous decisions.  The rationale for a decision can inform thus 
both the obligation to adhere and to depart from it.  If that previous rationale is thought 
erroneous, the very concept of stare decisis, on Cross’ elucidation of it, permits of exceptions.  
One might contend that Cross and Wesley-Smith thus appear thus at odds. If the former 
illustrates the consistency of application of stare decisis even when the precedent is departed, 
and the latter argues its inherent incompatibility with theories (and the practice) of 
adjudication, does such not appear contradictory. This may be, however, for my purpose both 
views, I suggest support my assertion of the permissibility, and not just because it is a 
possibility, but arguably a necessity of the continued validity of law, of exception from 
precedent, binding or otherwise.  This however is not to contend that such permissibility is 
without limits, but as I have indicated earlier in this paper, in the space available I am not able 
to consider the parameters of those limits, merely I am able and intending to argue that 
permissibility exists.   
 
Derogation 
 
Earlier I commented on Wesley-Smith’s conclusion as to theories of adjudication being 
incompatible with the notion of “binding precedent” in an absolute form. Having illustrated 
the application of that conclusion to the question of amnesty as seen as a departure from 
precedent, I now need to turn my attention to the contention that the notion or practice of 
78 
 
amnesty is incompatible with atrocity law. This is because, by its very nature, amnesty offers 
derogation from position that, as matter of atrocity law, one is not able to derogate from. 
  
Although there is some merit in the argument that there is a distinction between the practice 
of derogation and the practice of precedent, in terms of my discussion I see them as two sides 
of the same argument which I am looking to critique, although not necessarily refute. The 
argument for following precedent, at least in terms of not granting amnesty is concomitant 
with the argument from non-derogation. They are almost, in this context, synonymous. 
 
The concept of derogation centres on the premise that you cannot or should not derogate from 
obligations under which you are. This notion can be said to extend to your not being able to 
derogate from obligations which you have placed yourself under in correlation to the rights 
those obligations afford others. In terms of atrocity law the contention must follow these lines 
that States cannot derogate from the obligation that they have to prosecute atrocity crimes 
because of their very nature and gravity. Now this obligation to prosecute may be enshrined in 
treaty, for example the Rome Statute (establishing the International Criminal Court), or it may 
be thought of in terms of non-conventional duties. The latter, it might be argued is that the 
necessity for law to be efficacious is predicated on the fact that violations of it will not go 
unpunished. In short, in order to protect, you need to punish. Or at least have the possibility of 
punishment (arguably derived from the practice of precedent). And if you go one step further 
to contend that the duty to prosecute the gravest of crimes, those so atrocious that it is 
unconscionable to let them go unpunished, you are arguing that the duty to punish is a 
peremptory norm of law. And if peremptory it cannot be derogated from. 
 
I will, in the conclusion address a contemporary discussion of such a position with respect to 
international law, but I now wish to return to Kelsen, and particularly a paper he wrote in 
1962 entitled Derogation. 
 
Kelsen, Derogation and Validity 
 
We saw in an earlier chapter Kelsen’s contention that the validity of a norm is intrinsically 
linked to its efficacy. If not effective it cannot conceivable maintain valid. Norms in a positive 
moral order are more likely, Kelsen thinks, to lose their validity as a result “of the expiration 
of time for which they were valid” (1962, 261). This temporal validity is determined by either 
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the norm itself or another norm’s dictates. Or validity is lost “by the fact that is no longer is 
obeyed or applied and thus has lost its efficacy and thereby its validity, efficacy being a 
condition of validity” (italics mine) (261). In the latter loss validity derives from the lack of 
application or obedience both of which are question of fact. 
 
When might a norm’s validity may equally be invalidated by derogation? Kelsen contends 
that the loss of validity as a result of derogation is distinct from the loss as a result of 
disobedience of in-application. Derogation is the repeal of the validity of a valid norm by 
another norm. This repeal is by virtue of a derogating norm, but this refers not to particular 
behaviour, in a way that norms ordinarily stipulate the type of behaviour that we ought or 
ought not to do, that which is permitted and that which is prohibited, but to the ought (or the 
imperative) itself. As Kelsen remarks “The derogating norm repeals the ought, and that 
means, the validity of another norm according to which certain behaviour or the omission of a 
certain behaviour ought to take place. Consequently, a derogating norm cannot exist by itself 
but only in relation to the norm whose validity it repeals, and in that sense it is a dependent 
norm”(261). I previously noted Kelsen’s description of laws as norms and we may safely 
extend his discussion of norms from the moral to the legal realm. The question of the 
relationship and dependency amongst laws, as I have already suggested is pivotal to 
understanding the concept of amnesty. Amnesty (as a concept rather than by any particular 
content) cannot exist independently of the law against which it is offered. In that sense it is a 
dependent law. (Even if you were not to accept the contention that laws are synonymous or an 
example of norms, the relational dependency argument could still be maintained in respect of 
the suggestion that amnesty relates to the norm that those who commit atrocious acts ought to 
be accountable for them, or more broadly still we are responsible for our actions). However 
because, as we have seen above, derogation is an act of repealing the ought (Kelsen describes 
such as establishing a non-ought (Ibid) and as Kelsen contends that the derogating norm “does 
not conflict with the norm whose validity it repeals” (263). Thus derogation, as repeal, 
provides exception from, rather than negation of a norm’s existence. 
 
In so far as the act of derogation is concerned Kelsen believes such can be legislative and in 
terms of the impetus for such legislation, “the norm-creating authority may hold the validity 
of a norm is unwanted and, therefore may wish to terminate its validity” (262) and thus render 
the norm ineffective. Again we return to the possibility of permitting, because its application 
is “unwanted” exception from a norm by a legislative act. Amnesty as illustrative of such an 
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act of derogation, as the validity of a norm being (contingently) unwanted) can be easily 
drawn.  
 
To take but one example Article IX of the Lome Peace Agreement provided that the 
Government of Sierra Leone, which of course I contend is a ‘norm-creating authority’ was “in 
order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone” to take “legal steps” to provide amnesty or 
pardon in terms of ensuring “no official or judicial action” would be taken against those 
whose behaviour would have amounted to atrocity crimes and to take “legislative and other 
measure necessary” offer guarantees of immunity to former combatants to facilitate 
“reintegration within a framework of full legality” (Hirsch, 2001, 143). The absence of want 
for the norm of accountability is evident in these words, but the concluding phrase, I suggest 
indicate that the temporal or spatial validity is what is affected, again exception from the 
norm, not negation of the norm itself. 
 
Because amnesty removes obligations that you would otherwise be under, the only way in 
which this properly or logically can be removed, is by legislation that derogates from those 
obligations. As that act of derogation is an act of legislation from, in Kelsenian terms, a norm-
creating authority, this gives rises to another obligation that of recognizing the amnesty.  
 
The next question on which Kelsen remarks is then pivotal to my discussion, the issue of non-
derogation; “the question whether norms exist which cannot be derogated” (1973, 264). 
Kelsen’s proposition that “[a] norm can exclude its [own] derogation by another norm, but it 
cannot prevent the loss of its validity by loss of its efficacy” resonates from the work Kelsen 
footnotes of Regelsberger who, in 1893, wrote, “There is no law that cannot be changed. A 
legislator can make a change or the repeal of a legal norm very difficult by imposing 
conditions and limitations, but he cannot control the unchangeability of a legal norm, even for 
a limited period of time” (275n3). Thus the question of change or indeed the possibility of 
change is key. In line with his discussions as to the effect of derogation Kelsen remarks to the 
quote from Regelsburger “[t]here is no doubt that the legislator can ‘decree’ that a norm shall 
not be change, but the question is, what legal effect does it have if in spite of such a provision 
a norm is adopted which conflicts with it” (Ibid). The mere pronouncement of non-derogation 
would, in such circumstances, it seems, be insufficient to affect the effect, for example, of a 
legislative act of derogation.   
 
81 
 
Derogation and the resolution between conflicting norms - lex posterior derogat priori 
 
Having identified the feasibility of derogation from that ordinarily thought not possible to 
derogate from, we need to ascertain how it is acceptable to do so. At the start of this paper I 
spoke of the need for amnesty not to give rise to a logical contradiction with other laws, as it 
might on the face of it appear to do. We saw earlier Kelsen’s remark on the specific property 
of law be that it be ‘logical’ (1973, 228). Kelsen thought this point self evident to jurists and 
like the proposition that of two mutually contradictory statements, both cannot be true, “so, 
according to this assumption, only one of…two conflicting norms can be valid and the other 
must be invalid”.  He considered “[t]his finds expression in the principle: ‘lex posterior 
derogate priori’” (Ibid). 
 
Paulson’s, in his description of Kelsen’s varying interpretations of the principle, lex posterior 
derogate legi priori, describes the maxim and its effect as a “means of resolving conflicts 
between legal norms issued at different times” (Tur and Twining, 1986, 229). Paulson’s 
remarks leads us ultimately to Kelsen’s 1962 Derogation paper (1973, 261ff) which was the 
fourth and final phase of Kelsen’s views on the lex posterior principle.  Kelsen’s concern is 
fundamentally in the four position he held, the first and third being consistent with each other, 
in that they considered the principle, a priori or non-contingent in nature, and the second and 
last influenced by a colleague of Kelsen’s from the Vienna School, Alfred Merkl as 
considering the principle a posterior and contingent (229f).  In terms of amnesty as we can see 
it is of a dependent nature and would seem thus to be only capable of being defined in terms a 
posterior and contingent. This contention may of course be subject to further argument but I 
consider the following two quotes illustrative of the inherent or implicit nature, both, of the 
possibility of change, indicated as fundamental to the question of norm-validity above, and of 
the lex posterior principle itself.  In 1918 Merkl wrote “It is not correct to say that the 
principle of lex posterior derogat legi priori makes its possible to change the law. Rather it is 
just the reverse: it is the possibility of change (from within the legal system) that allows one to 
give expression to the lex posterior principle in the first place” (quoted in Paulson, 1986, 237) 
and Kelsen in the second edition of Reine Rechtslehre “Since the organ issuing norms - the 
king, say, or the parliament - is normally authorized to issue norms that may be changed and 
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therefore repealed, the maxim lex posterior derogate legi priori can be assumed 
[angenommen] to be included in the authorization” (Ibid, 243)68
 
 
Having very briefly addressed the contingent or non-contingent nature of lex posterior, I shall 
now return to von Wright who forty years after his first excursion into deontic logic posed the 
question: Is there a logic of norms? (1991).  
 
In this paper, von Wright considered the lex posterior rule. He explained this as a means by 
which to resolve conflict between O-norms (those of obligation) and P-norms (those of 
permission). To resolve a contradiction between a norm that obliges and one that permits, von 
Wright sees the feasibility or possibility of some type of “meta-norm”, to remove this conflict 
which he agrees it is not possible for logic to do. (Ibid, 277). Lex posterior is but one type of 
meta-norm and where norms are simultaneously given, (the giving deriving from the same “ 
‘source’ (norm-authority, law-giver)”(Ibid)), due to the inapplicability of lex posterior or lex 
anterior principles von Wright can conceive of a meta-norm by which obligation derogates 
permission or alternatively “a meta-norm of contrary nature which places “permission above 
obligation” (“granted freedom above duty”) (Ibid ,277f).   
 
Such a “meta-norm” that accords primacy to permission over obligation, is the premise of 
amnesty.  As the giving of that norm is from the “norm-authority or law giver” which can 
pass legislation to enable departure from the precedent, of ordinarily following that obligatory 
norm, because it’s application is unwanted, such law is an act of permissible derogation from 
a norm. And whilst this affects the spatial or temporal validity of the norm, does not 
invalidate the norm itself.   
 
The preceding can then provide us with a response to those who contend amnesty’s 
incompatibility with atrocity law as a result of their being certain norms or right, which we 
ought not to derogate from. The possibility of changeability inextricably leads to the 
feasibility of derogation, which, in and of itself, does not detract from the peremptory nature 
of the norm that atrocities ought to be punished.  
 
                                                 
68 In his conclusion Paulson is of the view that the categories ‘contingent’ and ‘non-contingent’ are 
“inappropriate”.  However his alternative “something taken from the model Duhemian holism” (246) does not 
defeat the argument I am seeking to sustain, if any it is supportive of the possibilities of change I am alluding to. 
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6. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Having identified the manner in which obligation to the law is properly understood to be 
established from the consensual perspective argued in chapter 2, through the permissibility 
both legal and logical, to be excepted from that obligation, posited in chapters 3 and 4, and 
that in so doing we do not violate the principle of precedent argued in chapter 5. Indeed 
amnesty is, in that sense, a derogation. And where “derogation is the repeal of the validity of a 
valid norm by another norm” this will not have consequences beyond the validity of that 
norm. Furthermore, “the derogating norm repeals the ought , and that means, the validity of 
another norm according to which certain behaviour ought to take place. Consequently, a 
derogating norm cannot exist by itself but only in relation to the norm whose validity it 
repeals, and in this sense is a dependant norm” (1973,261). The derogation’s dependency, in 
the e context of amnesty is also its contingency. The independent norm of punitive law may 
replace the dependent norm of amnesty. 
 
To derogate from norm or not 
 
To begin this conclusion I will turn to one contemporary argument in respect of the non-
derogation position69
                                                 
69 Another example than the one that follows can be found in the same publication where Dukic (2007) discusses 
the obligation to prosecute for war crimes and remarks that the corollary of such an obligation would be a ban on 
granting amnesties.  His position in made in a few short paragraphs (707) and is similar in the respects I am 
concerned with to Naqvi’s position. It is possible of course and should be recognized that other authors speak to 
the possibility of amnesties when meeting certain criteria.  Mallinder’s 2007 paper, Can Amnesties and 
International Justice be Reconciled? is a particularly strong example of a pragmatic approach. 
. In an article that discusses this argument in detail and is concerned with 
the extent to which there may be international recognition for amnesties granted in respect of 
war crimes Yasmin Naqvi concludes “[a]mnesties covering war crimes may be recognised in 
the limited circumstances where their non-recognition would amount to a threat a threat to 
peace and security, for example by undermining a peace agreement” yet “[e]ven in these 
circumstances, only those amnesties which are limited to internationally accepted parameters 
and which are not inconsistent with the fundamental obligations of States should be accorded 
international validity”.(624).  The first conclusion as to the question of the effect of non-
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recognition is reliant on such a determination, Naqvi argues, by the United Nations Security 
Council and follow such determination derives is validity from the primacy of obligations 
under the UN Charter when such conflict with obligations under “any other international 
agreements” (591)70
 
  Whilst I would not disagree with Naqvi contention, it should be noted 
that the Article from which she quotes is silent on the relationship of primacy between 
obligations under the Charter and obligation derived from domestic agreements or sources. 
This is important when one considers as remarked earlier the obligation clearly expressed in 
Article 6 of the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.  Naqvi quotes from 
the ICRC commentary to the Protocol that “[a]mnesty is a matter within the competence of 
the authorities.” (n 86)  My interest however lies in the development of that comment in the 
next sentence in the Commentary describing amnesty as “an act by the legislative power 
which eliminates the consequences of certain punishable offences, stops prosecutions and 
quashes conviction” (ICRC, 1987, 1402)  The Commentary does not further describe the 
nature of those authorities or legislative powers but it may be equally arguable that such 
authorities may well be domestic and if so then the comment to Article 103 of the UN Charter 
may lose its force. Indeed in the footnote to the preceding quote which deals with the English 
and French definitions of the term amnesty, the commentator remarks of amnesty that “[i]ts 
mode of operation and effect may obviously differ from country to country.  This suggests 
that those authorities or legislative powers are ordinarily of a domestic nature. The other 
qualification necessary to Naqvi argument from the point of view that this paper is addressing 
the issue is the fact that as the determination as to what amounts to a threat to peace and 
security is, one can easily demonstrate, dependant on varying factors with varying influence, 
so is potential for variation in the “internationally accepted parameters” which are envisaged 
to limit the scope of, if not the very determination itself. 
Naqvi’s premise for the inapplicability of Article 6(5) to war crimes is interestingly, the good 
faith principle in found in the Vienna Convention.  I have already dealt with the notion of 
good faith and the maxim pacta sunt servanda which underlies the practice of the exercise of 
good faith pursuant to the Vienna Convention. Naqvi argues, as a result of the rules of 
interpretation, that this is support for his contention that “it is difficult to conclude that Article 
6 covers amnesties for war crimes” because such would be “inconsistent with the primary 
objective of the Protocol”, that being “ensuring greater protection for the victims 
                                                 
70 The primacy of obligations under the Charter is derived from the Charter itself at Article 103. 
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of...conflict”.  Although the argument is commendable and I do not disagree with his 
summation of the intention behind the Protocol, she nonetheless foresees the possibility of 
permitting amnesty in certain contingent circumstances.  Such is counterintuitive to an 
argument of their being rights which do not permit derogation from them.  
 
Naqvi indicates one other approach to the interpretation of Article 6(5) when she includes 
reference in a footnote to Roht-Arriza and Gibson’s paper.  Their suggestion is to interpret 
6(5) with certain qualifications of which they give examples of basically recognition of 
victim’s rights or that “letting these criminals go free” might lead to social unrest.  Whilst I do 
not disagree with their sentiments per se I find it difficult not to simply use the text and the 
word ‘possible’ (which at the risk of being tautologous explicitly suggests possibilities and 
infers contingencies) as indicative of the myriad of contingencies which may inform either the 
grant or the rescission of amnesty, and thus a further attempt at definition is counterproductive 
to the end of applying the law to facts, not facts to the law.    
 
Naqvi in her argument it seems wishes to counter a number of courts who supported their 
findings that amnesties are valid under international law, and that their conclusions were 
reliant on an interpretation that the rationale behind the treaty obligation to endeavour to grant 
amnesty in Article 6(5).  Her argument is that one can counter that applicability and thus 
validity. 
 
In order to be valid law must first applicable.  That is why we have the principle of 
jurisdiction.  If your argument is that law does not apply then from the point of view to which 
the law does not apply it is not law at all.  It amounts to no more than an expression of a point 
of view.  To contend that one thing does not apply to another (for example a law to an action) 
is one step beyond suggesting that those things are incompatible.  I started this chapter and 
this paper by arguing that it is incorrect to contend that amnesty is incompatible with 
international law. Equally it is erroneous to suggest it is incompatible with atrocity law.  
Why?  First turns on the word itself.  I do not consider what follow to be mere semantics, for 
in law and amnesty is an aspect of law, language is key for that is what lawyers do, they 
interpret the language, generally written by others, although occasionally written by 
themselves.  To say amnesty is incompatible with an area or form of law is to suggest the two 
are mutually exclusive, or to use the definition from the Standard English “mutually 
intolerant” or “irreconcilable”.  To describe the relationship as inconsistent or incongruous is I 
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contend much more appropriate.  I have not sought to argue in this paper that amnesties are 
universally good or beneficially, nor could I contend so given some amnesties are self-granted 
and may as a result be later determined manifestly unjust or absurd.  No, the point is that 
amnesty is a permissible practice within those very spheres of law that others have contended 
are irreconcilable with amnesty.  Amnesties might very well be inconsistent with the 
principles practice and application of international law at any given time.  It is for that very 
reason that international tribunals are able to prosecute notwithstanding the grant of an 
amnesty, because even the subject of applicability is not one incompatible with the notion of 
exception.    
 
Compatibility and Congruity 
 
At the conclusion to my introduction I suggested that on should look at amnesty in the context 
not of its compatibility or not with other laws, be they domestic or principles or practice of 
international law, but rather is congruence or not with those laws.  I can now return to those 
issue and demonstrate why, incongruity is a more appropriate, realistic if you will contention.  
Congruity is as a matter of accordance or harmony, agreement in character or quality.  
Incongruity is the want of accordance with what is reasonable or the want of self-consistency. 
Such sentiments are more indicative of the inconsistency prevalent in any imperfect system, 
which law must to some degree be (and even more so in the case of positive law, given human 
fallibility), but which nonetheless is reconcilable in given contingent circumstances.  In 
practical terms the use of incongruity lends the necessary latitude in which the grant and 
rescission of amnesty may and must be performed, such latitude, demonstrable as I have 
contended in the context of legal obligations, enhances the efficacy and thus, in Kelsenian 
terms, the validity of the given law, be that amnesty, or the subsequent statute of the tribunal 
to try those crimes for which amnesty had been granted. 
 
“In philosophy we constantly confront the painful fact that what we deem to be rules have 
their exceptions” (Rescher 2006, 75).  Such confrontation I would suggest extends well 
beyond the realms of philosophy and may we be the understanding which we must ultimately 
in face in any discussion of the exception from rules.  In terms of amnesty it may well seem 
paradoxical to think that the absence of the obligation to prosecute, which is the effect of the 
grant of amnesty, as a matter of law, is the result of a subsequent obligation which requires us 
to adhere to that amnesty law.  The issuance of that law (or its rescission) from the law-giver 
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or norm-authority to use von Wright’s terminology is the premise if its validity and the 
precondition for its efficacy.  We may follow Rescher in the combination of his two 
discussions of the aporetic method in philosophy and the structure of philosophical dialectic 
in recognising that whilst “an apory is a group of contentions that are individually plausible 
but collectively inconsistent” (17) there is a means to restore consistency. That means is the 
“recourse to modification, replacing the abandoned belief with a duly qualified version thereof 
(76).  Now whilst I have indicated throughout that it is not a question of the abandonment of a 
belief that those who commit crimes of atrocity, ought to be punished, the recourse to 
modification, must and I hope I have illustrated in terms of the qualifications which are 
present in each of the issues I have discussed in the preceding chapters.  The basis of 
obligation is qualified by the consent of those who wish so to be bound; obligations may 
permit of exceptions, in turn giving rise to other obligations; the relationship of obligation to 
permission is qualified in it being of only relative, logical application; accordance to 
precedent may equally be excepted from and derogation, by its very nature permits of 
exception from what might otherwise be thought peremptory laws.   
 
Interpreting amnesties 
 
There are perhaps two predominate schools of thought in contemporary treaty interpretation.  
Those who adopt for a literal or textual interpretation of the text and those who might be 
described as intentionalist or purposive, that is to suggest that one should look behind the veil 
of the text and interpret a treaty in light of what the parties to the treaty intended either its 
effect to be or what their obligation would be. The topics under discussion in this paper may 
then be properly put in a wider context in the debate between what can be described as the 
object and purpose interpretation of international law and treaties or agreements in particular, 
and a literal or textual approaches. The purposive approach has been adopted practically and 
argued extensively by Aharon Barak.  Barak, a former President of the Supreme Court of 
Israel concluded that “ Purposive interpretation meets the condition of efficacy” namely it can 
“extract legal meaning from the range of semantic meanings of the text” and “[u]nlike some 
systems of interpretation, like textualist systems, it has the power to resolve every interpretive 
problem presented to it” (2005, 219)  However that is only one part of the equation, ‘proper’ 
interpretation “must be able to give the text the meaning that best achieves the goal of 
interpretation” (Ibid), that goal being “to achieve the objective – in other words, the purpose – 
of law” (Ibid, 220).  Such a system is qualified by the permissible exercise of judicial 
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discretion, which can resolve uncertainty but such discretion “is a legitimate – but neither 
exclusive nor primary – component of purposive interpretation” (Ibid, 219).   
 
The purposive approach or tradition is equally, one can suggest strong in the United States.  I 
his recent work, Stephen Breyer spoke of his adherence to the purposive tradition (2008, 
113f) and the manner in which it imbues his interpretation of the US Constitution in the spirit 
of active liberty. Active liberty, is equally resonant I suggest of the arguments I have been 
advocating since the first chapter.  It is a reflection, as Breyer describes of the philosopher 
Benjamin Constant’s reference to the distinction of “‘liberty of the ancients’ and the ‘liberty 
of the moderns’” (9).  Active liberty, seeks to encourage the notion of the sharing of 
sovereignty amongst the nations citizens its people (10, 25). This is the very same sentiment 
that underlies the consensual notions that give rise to obligation that I discussed in the first 
chapter. 
 
This brings me to my final point.  In light of the forgoing can we put the question that goes to 
the heart of this paper thus: Can you have a purposive interpretation of the obligation to 
follow peremptory norms such that it, in the context of amnesty permits of contingent 
exceptions from those norms? 
 
My suggestion is that, notwithstanding the aporetic nature of juxtaposing the terms 
peremptory with exception and incongruous though they may be, the answer, as I hope to 
have demonstrated is yes. 
 
In this paper I have sought to look at the question of exception from rule through the lens of 
apparently conflicting obligations: to punish or to permit.  What I hope to have demonstrated 
is that  
 
1. That adherence to obligation can be said to arise, ordinarily, consensually. 
2. Laws which we are thus obligated to follow may also be permissive in that they allow 
for us not to, on occasion, follow obligations that we would otherwise have. 
3. Logically, the relationship between obligation and permission is a conditional one. 
4. We can thus, derogate from that which paradoxically it might seem is not capable of 
derogating from. 
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Thus to conclude, that amnesties and the obligation they give rise to, being laws themselves, 
is a permissible contingent exception from the peremptory norm that we should be punished 
for our actions, even where though actions are thought atrocious.  The question as to what the 
conditions that qualify that exception ought to be, I leave to others, such as Mallinder.  My 
attempt has been only based on the answering the broader question of the permissibility of 
exception from rule.  Schmitt may well have been right that the sovereign is he who decides 
on that exception, but I believe that it is not the capacity to decide that defines sovereignty, 
rather the congruity with which those decisions ultimately reflect, for want of a better word, 
reason.  And that is why the question as to how the question of permissibility is answered is I 
feel so significant. 
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